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PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF DRUSE STUDENTS REGARDING VALUES OF A MODERN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

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Adolescents' Nationality, Peace and Security Perception in the Druze Community in Israel

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Abstract

One of the problems on the public agenda is the question of the status of the non-Jewish minority in the State of Israel. Debate and public discussion of these questions is ancient, although it has increased in times of national, social and political crisis.

The continuing crisis of Israeli democracy and the existing decades' old conflict with Arab States and the Palestinians have made these questions stand out, regarding all Israeli citizens, the loyalty of the minority to the State, and equal rights and obligations. The educational system of non-Jewish schools must cope with these difficult questions within school walls and in civics classes.

Sometimes, and particularly when discussing rights versus obligations, a question arises among the Druze regarding their level of identification with the State and their willingness to contribute and volunteer, even at risk of death among Druze youths, despite the lack of civic equal rights.

Over the past sixty years of statehood, the policies of Israeli governments towards the Druze have been typified by a desire to expand the lines dividing between the Druze and the Moslems. The idea of developing a unique identity among the Druze was at the basis of the Zionist policy towards the Druze.

Based on the fact that the Druze, unlike the Arabs, have tied their fate to the future of the State, and are full partners in defending the State's security, political leaders have consolidated a unique policy towards the Druze sector, different than the policy towards Israeli Arabs. This is expressed clearly regarding recruitment to the IDF and cultivating the

Druze national identity through official recognition of the Druze as an independent ethnic sect, creating a separate educational network for the Druze.

These decisions regarding application of equality between Druze and Jews, and integration of the Druze in Israeli society have led to many expectations among the Druze, and many disappointments. Many problems have not been resolved, and some have even gotten worse. Among the Druze, much frustration has developed because of the fact that they fulfill all their obligations to the State, but do not receive their full rights.

Therefore, often the question has arisen: Have changes occurred in youths' motivation to serve in the army and in their Druze and Israeli identity?

The present dissertation will address this question by presenting a questionnaire to a sample of 100 Druze 12th grade students learning in a Druze school and in a mixed Druze school, regarding their perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, motivation to serve in the IDF, democratic Druze values and national identity.

The research methodology at the basis of this study was quantitative, and examination of differences between groups was conducted using T tests and correlations between variables.

The aim of the present dissertation is to learn about and examine perceptions of Druze youth in Israel regarding the IDF, democracy and Druze values.

The questionnaire included questions in the following areas: Perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process; attitudes towards

service and volunteering for the State; the strength of Druze identity and faith.

It was hypothesized that within the framework of the peace process, that a difference would be found between the perceptions of Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.

It was also hypothesized based on the social contact theory, that as a result of exposure of Druze students in a mixed school to the Arab population which does not serve in the IDF, this would affect their level of identification with the State and their motivation to volunteer and contribute to the State.

It was also hypothesized that within the framework of principles of Druze faith, that a correlation exists between belief in Druze tenets and between volunteering for volunteer units at risk to life.

The first research hypothesis was proven. The social contact hypothesis was partially supported, and the Druze belief hypothesis was also partially supported.

The research findings showed that there are significant differences between the attitudes of Druze students learning in a Druze school and those of students in a mixed school. The research results are comprehensive and complex. More detailed attention to the findings is provided in the body of the dissertation, but a number of points are clearly indicated:

1. Despite the frustration and lack of equal rights for Druze in Israel, the sense of being Israeli and belief in the State among Druze students is high.

2. Druze youth perceive the IDF positively, particularly becoming an officer, which is considered to be part social standing, and career military service, considered a source of income.
3. Schools and educational curricula are relatively unimportant.

The present research and its findings are important and include recommendations for future research. The dissertation allows learning about the perceptions of Druze students regarding military service, the components of Druze identity, and Druze values.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Illustrations

Introduction

The State of Israel is presently going through changes related to the peace process with its neighbors, and as expected, the peace process involves ups and downs.

The negotiations regarding peace are accompanied by terror attacks and victims, and lead to doubts regarding the nature of the agreement which Israel has signed. Peace and the dangers that are involved have become doubly important as we consider security in our lives.

Israeli youths play an important part in carrying the security burden. Youths are also the next generation and the future of the State. Therefore it is very important to understand the attitudes of youth and their values regarding security, peace and society.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the vast majority of Druse youth aged 18 has been recruited into the army and has served their three years in compulsory service.

The security and existence of the State of Israel depend on the willingness of Jewish and Druze youths to serve in the army, and when necessary to give of themselves for the defense of the State and its residents. The Druze youths fulfill their duties and expect the State to grant them their full rights just like those of Jewish residents of the country.

The existence of the Druze minority in Israel has created many security, legal, social and moral dilemmas for the government since the inception of the State. It has been a moral, social and security challenge to decide on the status of the Druze minority in a Jewish state, and if they should be treated differently than other minorities. In Israel's declaration of

independence , it is stated that Israel is a democratic state and maintains equal social rights for all citizens, no matter what religion, race or gender.

The security of the State and its existence depends on the willingness of Jewish and Druze youths to volunteer to serve in the IDF, and when necessary give of themselves and contribute on behalf of the State.

But often, a question arises regarding level of identification with the State and willingness to contribute and volunteer at risk to life, among Druze youths, despite the lack of equality in civic rights.

The Jewish nation living as a minority throughout the world struggles for equal rights, and now is in the opposite situation, when it is a majority in its own independent country, within which live minorities whose identification with the State is not a given fact.

Based on recent security events within Israel, the terror attacks, the Intifada and wars, and on the other hand, the bitterness and feelings of discrimination among the Druze as a result of lack of equal rights, the question regarding the level of motivation of Druze youth to volunteer for the IDF and contribute to the State arises. Have changes occurred in this motivation in the past years, particularly recently based on the Second Lebanon War which hit the Israeli home front hard?

The aim of the present dissertation is to learn about and examine the perceptions and attitudes of Druze students regarding the security of the State, peace and values.

The Literature Review

1. Majority-Minority Relations in Pluralistic States

Minorities of all types: cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial, exist throughout the world (Griessman, 1975; I'ylon, 1979). In almost every country in the world there is at least one minority group (Lijphart, 1980). From among all of the independent countries that existed in 1973, 90% of them had at least one minority group (Smooh, 1976). Of the 18 countries of the Mediterranean Basin, 13 counties are multi-ethnic, and all together contain 55 ethnic groups (Kliot, 1989).

One fifth to a quarter of all the residents of the Middle East belong to a minority group characterized by different ethnic and national origins, separate religious belonging, different customs, languages, dialects or special ceremonies (Olmert, 1986). The world contains different types of minorities, and there is no single unequivocal definition for the term minority (Wirsing, 1981). Simpson & Yinger (1985) define minority as a group of people who have cultural attributes different from those of others living together with them within the same society, and who consider themselves a different group.

Hepburn (1979) defines minority as a non-dominant group within the population which aims to maintain its ethnic, religious, linguistic, or traditional attributes, setting it apart from the rest of the population. Banton (1972) defines a minority as a special group of people that composes less than half of the population. Wagley & Harris (1958) defined minority as a group of people that is inferior from a status standpoint, and subordinate to the larger group, characterized by special cultural attributes perceived as less respected by the dominant social group.

Almost all societies throughout the world are pluralistic societies. Pluralism is generally expressed in cultural variety between ethnic groups, inequality, social status gaps, and disparities in division of power and resources among different groups, a lack of cohesion and a lack of solidarity and cooperation between groups (Smooha, 1976). These attributes are repressive and affect relations between minority groups and the ruling majority, making these relationships problematic, and full of hatred, suspicion and the potential for violence. They create political and moral problem on both the local and international planes. Conflicts stemming from ethnic plurality are difficult to cope with, and their severity is a great threat to the territorial wholeness of the state (Muir & Paddison, 1981).

Minority problems have existed throughout history, beginning with the problems of the Jews in ancient Egypt (Hepburn, 1979). Minorities play varied roles, and use different strategies to solve their problems. Barron (1967) divided minorities into four groups based on their goals:

1. Pluralistic Minorities have pluralistic goals and they demand tolerance on the part of the dominant group. The Druze in Israel belong to this group.
2. Assimilationist Minorities aim mainly to assimilate. They would like to be fully included in the life of the larger group.
3. Secessionist Minorities, aim to secede from society and achieve political independence from the dominant group.
4. Militant Minorities, aim to struggle and to control the other groups that compose society.

The many minority groups in the Middle East have caused many ethnic problems, despite the existence of the strong cultural and religious attribute of Islam (Harik, 1972). Druze, who are one of the smallest minorities in the Middle East, similar to many minorities worldwide, have managed to survive and maintain their ethnic uniqueness, thanks to the physical geographical conditions that exist in their mountain settlements (Olmert, 1986) in Lebanon, Syria and Israel.

Syria is a country whose population is varied and split, almost like that of Lebanon. Certain minorities are concentrated in specific regions. Syrian policy ignores problems stemming from the country's population composition, and aims to solve the problem by assimilating ethnic groups and minorities within the Sunni Muslim majority. Hesitation regarding the creation of a pluralistic political system in Syria has greatly determined its grip on the Pan-Arab nationalistic theory in Syria, according to which Druze are Arabs. Ethnic loyalty and definition are perceived as separatist, and therefore hostile towards the Arab national interest. This approach has been unable to cancel out ethnic identification and its importance as a factor in relations between Druze and other ethnic groups (Rabinowitz, 1989).

Throughout the generations, the Druze have been in a constant blood soaked battle with the Arab Sunni Moslems. In the 18th century during Ottoman reign, as a result of this struggle, they retreated to the mountains that are named after them, the Druze Mountains. When Syria was under the French Mandate rule in the 1920s, the Druze fought against being included as part of Arab Syria (Fisher, 1980). As a result of their struggle, an agreement was signed between the Druze and the French in 1921,

according to which Druze Mountain was declared independent under the auspices of the French Mandate (Roi, 1957).

Rejection of the "multi-character" principle of the state on the part of the Syrian government is expressed in its attitude towards the Druze minority, an attitude which led to the cancellation of the autonomous status that the Druze enjoyed. This led to the rebellion of the Druze in 1954, a rebellion that was cruelly repressed by the Syrian army (Ben Arie, 1978; Firro, 1988). As a result, and despite their geographic concentration on Druze Mountain and their religious social uniqueness, the Druze process of assimilation in Syria was accelerated, expressed in their integration in the Syrian army and among the ranks of the Ba'ath ruling party in Syria (Olmert, 1986). This has led to their loss of status, being now considered a small, inconsequential minority lacking any cultural, political or militant influence (Kliot, 1989).

Lebanese ethnic structure is characterized by religious differences. And despite the fact that everyone speaks a common language and shares a common culture, ethnic feelings differ and separate between them. Therefore, very few Lebanese citizens identify with their country and define themselves as Lebanese (Gordon, 1980). The Lebanese political system was based on recognition of the importance of ethnic separatism, balance between ethnic groups, and the need to cope with this balance (Rabinowitz, 1989). In Lebanon's National Convention of 1943, a formulation was made of the continued existence of Lebanon. The Druze received their part as a six percent minority, and since then a tradition has been created whereby the Defense Minister of the Lebanese government is a member of the Druze sect (Olmert, 1986). That is to say, the Druze

enjoy status that is disproportionate to their numbers, and have managed to maintain their rights, their strong status, and their political and cultural identity (Kliot, 1989).

The current crisis in Lebanon that continues to eat away at the power of the central government, together with Israel's intervention in Lebanon in 1982, and the armed struggle between the Druze and Lebanese Christian forces during the First Lebanon War and the Shuf War between the Druze and the Christians after the Israeli forces retreated, completed the tear between the Druze and the state, which led to Druze autonomy in the Shuf Mountains (Firro, 1988) and continued emphasis placed on Druze uniqueness as a separate ethnic group. However, for historical and political reasons, the Druze do not deny their Arab nationalism (Salah, 1989).

Israeli society is a pluralistic society composed of three main ethnic groups: Jews of Eastern European origin, Jews of Oriental origin, and Arabs. Oriental Jews have been assimilated into Israeli Eastern European society (Halpern, 1980). Nevertheless, there are conflicts between Oriental and European Jews, which are not institutionalized, and less severe than other conflicts, such as those between secular and religious Jews. The third conflict within Israeli society, which is the most severe, is the national pluralism between Jews and Arabs, which is a deep cultural, religious, institutional, ideological, nationalistic, status based and regional split (Smooha, 1976).

Even in ancient times, the Israeli nation was forced to cope with problems of religious or nationalist minorities. As a result of this reality, there are references in the Mishna and Gemarrah to a number of Jewish laws that

are based on concern for normal relations with minorities and the creation of coexistence. There has never been a Jewish religious trend to cause strife between non-Jewish minorities living in Israel . In the State of Israel, the central Israeli government and the dominant Jewish majority takes on the pluralistic approach described in the models by Kliot (1989) and Simpson & Yinger (1985). **This approach allows the existence of various cultures and minorities within the state, and supports their rights using legal and institutional methods, expressed in the existence of a unique system of relations between the Jewish majority and the other nationalistic and religious minorities, based on the principles of coexistence and mutual respect, outlined in the Declaration of Independence.**

2. The Status of the Druze Minority in the State of Israel

The Arab minority in Israel is composed of three religious groups: Moslem, Christian and Druze. The question of Druze belonging to the Arab minority is unclear, and there has been no historical research of the ethnic origins of the Druze to provide an unequivocal answer to this question. A number of Western researchers have argued that the Druze are the descendents of ethnic groups that lived in the region and were eradicated over the course of history, or they have attributed the Druze to Persian, Turkish, Indian, Hittite or even European origin (Firro, 1988). Other Western researchers and Druze and Arab historians have argued that the Druze are Arabs originating from the Arabian peninsula (Talia, 1973 Abu Izzeddin,1984).On the other hand, the Arab historian Hitti (1928) argues that the Druze are a mixture of Persian, Kurdish and Arabic races.

Throughout all historical eras, the Druze were only a majority in the Middle East in their own limited regions. But in comparison to the entire administrative region or state - whether Syria, Lebanon or Israel, they have been a small minority, generally subordinate to Sunni Moslem rule, which did not recognize them as a separate sect (Salah, 1989). The unity of the Druze in the Middle East stems from their need to maintain existence of their ethnic group, maintaining a unique religion, within the broader Moslem world, which considers them to be heretics. Therefore the Druze have required a flexible and multi-faceted policy in order to maintain their existence. The need to adjust to the powers that be in the region stems from the fact that they are a minority and their religion allows them to mask themselves and adjust in cases of persecution. The Druze tend towards separatism. Throughout their history they have maintained their religious independence. This separatism is based on their ethnic and religious uniqueness, but with all of the Druze separatist leanings, no desire has ever developed for full independence. They do not rebel against foreign rule over them, on condition that the rule does not disrupt their traditional and religious lifestyle (Yanai, 1972). Although the entire Druze sect is considered to be one ethnic group, it is possible to consider them separately based on geographic areas - the Galilee and the Carmel. The Druze of the Galilee live in small isolated villages, far from the city. On the other hand, the Druze of the Carmel live near the city and their exposure to the Jewish community is greater.

The Druze ethnic group in Israel is known to be unique as a minority group. It is a sect that has maintained its religious, social, geographic and ethnic nature for more than 900 years. Because they are a separate sect,

they have been propelled into mountain regions where they set up their towns. In this way they would be close to one another or at least able to maintain eye contact between their villages. In Israel the Druze population numbers approximately 80,000 members (C.B.S., 1990), living in 22 towns spread throughout the north of Israel, and in two other areas of the Middle East, Lebanon and the Druze Mountain of Syria. Eye contact between these villages is absolute and includes 18 towns in Israel spread through the Carmel, Lower Galilee, Upper Galilee, and Western Galilee. Eight of these villages are solely Druze, while four contain Druze and Christians only, and five contain a mixed population of Druze, Christians and Moslems. There are no villages which contain only Druze and Moslems. 22% of the population live in the Carmel, 60% live in the Galilee, and the 18% remaining live in four villages on the Golan Heights, a separate group from the rest of the State of Israel. They are different in nature, geographic position and their relationship with the Israeli government and population (Sofer, 1992).

From the standpoint of their aims, the Druze of Israel are similar to pluralistic minorities described in Barron's model (1967). They would like to maintain their religious and cultural uniqueness and demand tolerance of the dominant group. This assumption is based on the fact that throughout all historical eras, the Druze have aimed for separate and institutionalized status. During the Ottoman period and during the British Mandate the Druze did not manage to achieve a status equal to that which the Moslems, Christians and Jews attained, a status of a community with religious definition, legislative institutions and family law courts. They were considered to be Moslems (Shammash, 1970). The Israeli

government responded to their request in 1950 when it appointed a minister of the religious council (spiritual leader), and in 1957, the government first recognized the Druze of Israel as an independent sect. Later, in 1962, the government passed the Law of Druze Courts (Falah, 1974). It has been said that the Druze adopt loyalty to the country for which they fight, giving their loyalty without hesitation to the homeland in which they live. But in Israel this is both a national feeling and a feeling of fate, as they do not feel that they live as a minority.

The question of Druze national attribution to Israel is problematic. In Syria and Lebanon, the Druze are totaled with the Arab nation. However the Druze in Israel, for historical and geographical reasons, allow themselves to operate based on their own interests and to show a position which is not sympathetic towards or serving the National Arab Movement (Salah, 1989). The establishment and Israeli researchers consider the Druze of Israel as a unique and separate category from the Jewish sector and the Arab sector. The existence of this category is explained based on culture, history, ethnic group, and explained generally as a product of the long tradition of separatism and solidarity of the Druze (Oppenheimer, 1985). Israeli policy has emphasized the traditional particularism of the Druze and reinforced their identity, separating it from Arab and Islam identity (Firro, 1988). Within the framework of this policy for highlighting Druze uniqueness, in 1976 it was decided that Druze Heritage would be studied in Druze schools in order to highlight the unique values of Druze cultural tradition and cultivation of Druze-Israeli awareness, the uniqueness of Druze tradition, and in order to educate Druze who are proud of their heritage, loyal to their tradition and religion and the values of their culture, and loyal to the State of Israel.

Formal recognition of the Druze sect in Israel has paved the way for Druze political separation from the rest of the Arab minority on a nationalistic basis. When registering residents of Israel and classification of the population, there are two categories: Religion and Nationality. Druze religion has been added to the list that exists which in the past included Jews, Moslems and Christians. If the Druze are considered to be a religions sect, and from a nationalistic standpoint they are not Jews, they may only be attributed to the Arab national group, and this was how they had been registered until the early 1960s. At this time a change occurred: the similarity of the Druze to the Jewish model in which religion and nationality were connected, served as an example to create a new "nation", and as of 1962, the name "Druze" replaced "Arab" as their nationality on Druze birth certificates and identification cards. Since then the Druze of Israel are officially not Arabs. The most outstanding symbol of the separation of the Druze from the rest of the Arab minority is their obligatory service in the IDF (Oppenheimer, 1985).

The role of the Druze in the Israeli army has always been ideologically important within Israeli political culture. According to Frisch (1993) the role of the Druze population in the Israeli army and security forces is unusual in modern times. Not only are the Druze considered to be a minority population within the Israeli defense forces, but they are also a military minority who specializes in handling the problematic Palestinian minority.

Olivia (1972) who related to the question of the Druze national belonging, argued that there are three central trends within the Druze sect in Israel: some argue that they do not see the Druze as Arabs, because

from their free will they are interested in identifying with the state of Israel and creating a covenant with the state. This sector is interested in creating uniqueness in both Druze and Israeli awareness. The next group considers the Druze to be Arabs but does not attribute this fact with any significance requiring them to behave in a specific way. What is much more significant is the fact that they are Israeli Druze. This group also strongly speaks about Druze Israeli awareness and the desire for involvement in living along with the state and its citizens, of course without losing its Druze uniqueness. They also see their recruitment to the IDF very positively and their desire is to achieve rights and obligations equal to all the Jewish Israeli citizens. The third group is the one that considers themselves Arabs, identifying totally with the Arab nationality. Those with this outlook consider their service in the IDF as a clear contradiction to their nationalistic Arab identity.

For more than twenty years, the Israeli establishment considered the Druze to be like all other minorities and handling of their problems was through the "Arab departments" not differentiating between Druze, Moslems and Christians. According to Frisch (1993) the strongest official Israeli voice calling for integration of the Druze was heard in 1967 when the Prime Minister Levy Eshkol was impressed by Druze performance in the Six Day War, separating between the Druze and the rest of the Arab population, allowing the Druze to turn directly to various Government offices and considering them equally to the Jewish citizens of Israel. This was done despite the fact that Druze youths served three years in the army and many continued after their service to serve in the security forces, mainly giving their lives for the security of Israel. Druze

youths found out during their military service and after their liberation from the security forces, that they had more in common with their Israeli friends in arms than with their Arab neighbors. But on the other hand, they were not equal to them in the eyes of the establishment . The Druse's recruitment to the IDF and their integration in the Israeli security system led to an economic revolution in Druze villages (Sofer, 1992), because in the past, the economy of Druze villages was not much different than other minority villages in Israel. Economy was based on traditional agriculture, orchards and even fewer crops than the Moslems on the plains. A small number of individuals supported themselves through services within the village, and an even smaller number provided services outside of the villages. Some provided transportation services, as the Druze villages are far from major cities. Hassan (1998) found that more than 555 of those employed among the Druze began to work in the various security forces: the IDF, Border Police, police, prison services and the Military Industry. As early as the end of the 1960s, Druze youths began to demand that handling of their issues be removed from the Arab departments and they found support for this among the Jews. In the middle of the 1970s, the government responded to their demands and appointed the Ben Dor Committee in 1974. In 1975, the Schechterman Committee examined the issue and recommended removing the Druze from the Arab offices of the government, and transferring their treatment to the General Managers' committee, composed of the General Managers of the Government Offices and of Druze Consultants (Salah, 1989). Later, in April 1987, the government decided to provide Druze with equal rights to Jews, but this decision was never actually applied, and the Druze have not been properly handled receiving full rights like Jewish youths,

despite military services. This has led to frustration and uprising among youngsters in the sect. Recently the feelings of neglect and frustration have led to uprisings and strong claims have been heard against government policy, such as: "Loyalty but no nurturing", "we are equal to Jews only in obligations", "we want to be blue and white", etc.

In summary, the Druze of Israel are a national minority and consider themselves to be an integral part of the State of Israel. They are in the process of being integrated in the Israeli state and society (Stendel, 1973). On the other hand, the Druze of Syria and Lebanon consider themselves an integral part of the Arab world (Olivia, 1972).

This integration has led to changes and modernization in Druze villages and allows them to place pressure on the Israeli establishment for receipt of benefits in the field of education and development (Mayer, 1976). It should be noted that integration is still only partial, and the Jews along with the Druze doubt actual realization of full integration in the future (Friendly, 1981). Druze youth considers their recruitment into the IDF as part of their civic obligation towards the state and expect equal rights from the state to those of the Jewish population serving in the army, expressed in equality and equal opportunities in democratic political life and good citizenship.

3. Druze Values

In recent years, Druze society has been in a process of transition to more modernization and openness towards the western world. Despite the fact that this is occurring in other Oriental cultures, this socialization process

is entirely directed based on the Druze religious philosophy. This philosophy emphasizes the individual's unlimited identification with the omnipotence of God, and directs the individual to accept the basic values of his culture, maintaining them and identifying with his family and the Druze community. The basic values of Druze culture stem from its religion and focus on three principles:

The first principle is the principle of "Tikiya" or "hiding". This principle stems from Druze history from the era of "El Mahana" (the Test) from 1018-1024. During this time the Druze were persecuted in Egypt and Syria and were forced to renounce their Druze religion. The principle of hiding allows those who uphold it to pretend they belong to the ruling religion, but to secretly maintain the principles of their religion (Abu Shikra, 1984; Abu-Izzeddin, 1984). The principle of hiding became ingrained in the Druze culture in many ways, even after the Druze were not persecuted anymore. Therefore in the political-social sphere, this principle is expressed in the fact that the Druze adjust to and are loyal to the country in which they live.

The second principle is the principle of "Hafed El Ahoan" (assisting brothers). Druze religion attributes ultimate importance to helping one's Druze brothers. This principle reinforces internal loyalty, which cancels out individual importance in face of the entire group. Therefore the individual must suit himself to his environment.

The third principle is the principle of "Alrada Ve'Atislam" (acceptance). This principle means accepting the will of God and His decrees. If the Druze individual feels that he is in distress, according to his religion he must only trust in the force of God to change the situation for the better.

He must pray and accept the decree (Elkesma) out of belief in the fact that fate could be either a punishment or a test. Furthermore, Druze believe in "Tekmatz" (reincarnation), according to which the soul moves from body to body and does not die.

These principles, according to which Druze youths are educated, direct the Druze towards a process of acceptance and adjustment. Therefore, they do not try to change their environment but rather themselves, and to accept what occurs around them as the will of God, which must not be opposed.

Based on these religious beliefs taught in the Druze Heritage curriculum, Druze adolescents tend to maintain belief in fate and reincarnation as values which affect their future behavior, particularly when they volunteer and risk their lives, as will be examined in the research. Druze beliefs have an impact over volunteering and serving in the army.

4. Identity

According to the philosophical theories of Descartes and Kant (Fox, 1993), the concept of identity is defined in terms of unity. Taylor's (1991) and Alexander's (2001) community approach define the concept of identity as "Who are we? And where do we come from? Where are we going?". Other theorists, such as Heiddeger (Fox, 1993) define identity in terms of essence. Further theories have defined identity as a product which is designed by political mechanisms historically built into structure and organized from a social standpoint (McLaren, 1997; Gur-Ze'ev, 1997).

Psychological theories understand the concept of identity as an internal structure developing and becoming consolidated within the individual like other psychological structures such as emotions, cognition etc. (Erikson, 1968; ; Zuriel, 1990). Sociological anthropological theories attribute identity to being a direct result of the socialization process within the community (Roseman et al., 1990; Fisherman, 1992; Ben Shalom and Hornchik, 2000; Holland, 1998).

A survey of psychological and sociological theories will assist in surveying the problem of identity in the State of Israel, where concern for identity is great. The modern democratic world of the State of Israel developed dialogue regarding the issue of identity among various groups, such as the Arab group, and recently the Druze group. The State of Israel is considered to be a multi-cultural state, containing various groups and communities committed to the democratic regime, in which it is impossible to apply the principle of a majority forcing itself on the other groups within the state, based on political elements serving the benefit of the majority (Gur-Ze'ev, 1997). From the viewpoint of liberal theories, the concept "democracy" should reflect that a state maintains good, fair and just relations towards all groups existing within it (Taylor, 1989; Alexander, 2001). In Israel this attribute is in doubt and requires a new look based on the theoretical aspects mentioned above.

The Concept of Identity Based on Philosophical Theories

Descartes and Kant (Fox, 1993) define the concept of identity in terms of unity. Descartes perceived identity in terms of an important entity versus a spreading entity, while Kant perceived identity in terms of the

transcendental self and the experimental self. At the same time, Heiddeger, an existential philosopher, perceived the concept of identity in qualitative terms (Fox, 1993), i.e., not its unity but rather the essence of the human individual is what is important. Golomb (2000) argues that identity generally contains consensual components which apply to sects, publics, societies, and nations and also exist within cultures and languages, and are identifiable. On the other hand, authenticity is much more hazy, because it involves the connection of the individual with himself, his ego, and is much more easily definable. This is the way I identify myself and create myself. An authentic individual creates and molds his life and personality through what he creates.

The community perception (Taylor, 1989, 1991) criticizes liberal philosophy. This criticism brings us back to Hegel's critique of Kant. Hegel argues that it is impossible to maintain a society based on freedom as Kant perceives it, based on the "self" - the individual, which is detached from the community, society, language and history. According to Walzer (1984) the "self" is too small to set up the citizen within democratic society which must make complex decisions based on certain morals. Therefore instead of declaring the end of the modern era as done by various post-modernists, and offering radical solutions like the neo-Marxists, the community perception offers an essential correction to radical society by perceiving the individual as a product designed within the community and through the moral dialogue that the individual develops with the community, based on education towards insight, the ability to err, and freedom of will.

On the other hand, the critical theory, which is pessimistic and innovative (McLaren, 1997: Gur-Ze'ev, 1997), stems from radical Marxist tradition as presented by Marx, and existentialism as presented by Heiddeger.

This pedagogy comes out against political, economic and status based repression and calls for identification of power mechanisms that operate behind actions, and understanding the ways that human identity is designed within the public space.

The present dissertation will depend upon these two philosophical theories, the critical and the innovative, which will assist in understanding the manner in which Druze identity is formed and how the group supercedes the individual. Community is made possible through a new way of thought regarding construction of Druze identity in terms of freedom of will, insight and the ability to err.

Taylor (1991), a primary supporter of community theory, argues that the concept of authenticity belongs to modern culture. The idea of authenticity is the idea of freedom, including design of one's personal life, which opposes conformist external formats. According to Taylor, defining the self means finding the self according to my ability to debate important truths, or through my resurrection of my forefathers' traditions. He calls for the dissolution of Kant's isolating self (Fox, 1993), and brings the self into society, demanding that it be recognized. Our identity is designed through dialogue with others, and it does not matter if we agree with them or not. Furthermore, Taylor (1989) argues that our identity is defined by commitments and identification, which construct the platform on which we are able to determine what is good or valuable, what should be done, and to what we oppose. He argues that we are entities that are created in a space full of questions, and we search for an orientation towards good. This can only exist and be emphasized as a social-cultural language.

Therefore, Taylor (1989) feels that the preferred definition of an individual's identity is that which includes not only the individual's moral attitudes and spiritual issues, but is also connected to some social definition. The Druze sect can be seen as a sect that is searching for a way to maintain its unique identity as a minority in a country that aims for modern status in political and economic terms, on one hand, but as a nation which may have left these modern perceptions for similar attitudes in post-modern philosophy.

Personal Psychological Identity

Psychological approaches generally understand the concept of identity as an internal structure that develops, is consolidated and expressed within the individual, without any emphasis on the issue of the dialectics taking place between the individual and society, similar to other psychological structures, such as cognition, emotions, etc.

The concept of personal identity was coined as a basic concept within the psychology of adolescence by Erikson (1968). But this concept was perceived in terms of the individual's dialectics with society and not only in terms of internal structures developing within the individual, providing meaning to one's life. Erikson perceives the concept of personal identity as a concept developed throughout the individual's life at all stages of life. However, during adolescence its formation is the main developmental task. Breakwell (1986), Roseman and Frankel (1990) and Gortevant (1992) consider mutual relations between identity stemming from social factors external to the individual, when looking at the identity stemming from unique factors within the individual as those that finally design the overall self identity.

Group Identity in Sociology and Anthropology

Rachman (1975) considers the term "self identity" a central concept that aids adolescents, and emphasizes that the process of consolidating the identity cannot be an internal process that begins and ends within the individual himself, but rather, must spread out into the social and public planes. According to Reicher (1982), the individual within the group exchanges his individual identity for the group identity. Group identity within the mass is created by the actions of the group. The individual draws conclusions regarding group identity through the actions of its members. Ben Ami (1990) sees the family as a group and a response to the success in the individual process within the adolescent. Fishman (1997) argues that the process of searching for an identity generally occurs within the peer group. The "group of friends" becomes the adolescent's main object of attribution and replaces the parents. Fear of losing or blurring of self identity leads to certain phenomena, such as adhering to the group, lack of tolerance and cruelty, and distancing people who are different, all as a necessary form of defense against the feeling of blurred identity.

In their research on Jewish adolescents in Canada, Markstrom, Berman & Brusch (1998) discerned a concept called "ethnic identity". Chanel (1994) defined ethnic identity as the manner in which the individual understands himself in relation to others who have a shared racial, religious or national origin. This feeling of shared origin helps in creating an atmosphere of solidarity and connection to the ethnic group of attribution. The ethnic

identity of the individual can be only one of a number of identities within one's system, some of which are more essential than others, and some

of which become more central only because of special circumstances (Levin, 1951).

Social relations between ethnic groups may be characterized according to three dimensions: Separation-integration; majority control-equality; and struggle-cooperation. These dimensions may represent possible models of ethno-social relations in pluralistic societies (Kipnis, 1988; Smooha, 1984). Ben Shalom and Hornchik (1999) argue that in the literature there are a number of concepts that relate to the connection between the individual and his cultural group. They may be listed as: national identity, cultural identity, and basic group identity. Differentiating between the concepts is not always clear or consensual (Hutnik, 1991). One of the difficulties in identifying cultural identity through one concept (Liebkind, 1992) in a general manner is that cultural identity is a conglomerate of cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects expressing the nature of the connection between the individual and his ethnic, national or cultural group (Hutnik, 1991). Group identity of minority groups, including immigrant groups, is often discussed in the literature as the source of various difficulties on a psychological level (Ben Shalom & Hornchik, 1999). For example: low self esteem based on discrimination or prejudice (Tajfel, 1978); feelings of isolation and marginality (Blackwell & Hart, 1982); or a sense of confused identity (Erikson, 1968).

Religious Identity

The study of religious identity has expanded recently as a result of the impact of modernization over religious individuals. Amir (1992, in Shlomo and Bar-Lev, 2001) defines the religious identity of the

adolescent as a system of attitudes and positions that the adolescent holds regarding himself as a religious youth. Mol (1978) explains that religion develops religious identity and this contributes to group consolidation. The uniqueness of each religious group (ceremonies, beliefs and emotional involvement) creates a group identity that continues to be constructed through it. Religious truths later become a personal part of the individual in the group and a component of his religious identity. According to Rosen (2005), religion provides meaning to what we are, and is included in various circles and components of human identity (Beit Hallahmi (1989) argues that it is necessary to differentiate between religious identity, which is a "social label" and "religious belief", as a central component in perceiving identity. Relating to religions identity as a social label such as nationality, gender or socioeconomic status, is supported by the argument that most people in the world are born into this group, and this is an attributive and not achievable identity. The individual grows up in a family and a community having a certain religious attribution. On the other hand, there is a religions identity stemming from the individual's identification with a personal set of values.

Bar-Lev & Laslow (1993) present a number of central typologies for personal identity and religious identity. One of these typologies, conducted by Glock & Stark (1965) and Bar-Lev and Laslow (1993) characterizes five aspects of religiosity: 1) the belief-ideology aspect; 2) the behavioral-ritualistic aspect; 3) the emotional-experiential aspect; 4) the religious knowledge aspect; 5) the result aspect.

Biahihejad, Hode & White (1986) indicated that there is no connection between religious commitment and self identity . On the other hand,

Fulten (1997) found a positive correlation between identity status and religious orientation among Christian students.

Kind, Elder & Whitbech (1997) examined religious activity and self identity among rural youth and found a significant correlation between youth growing up in rural areas and the development of strong ties with religious institutions. It is also worthwhile to note the study by Tlicki (1997) which examined and found clear changes in self identity, but less in religious identity in Jewish youths of Polish origins who immigrated to Sweden. Pedersen (1997) found religious preferences of respondents to be in keeping with the centrality of aspects of self identity. Shafat (1995) feels that immigrant youths with a consolidated self identity know what to choose, whereas youths with confused identities do not know what to choose and their religious identity is less consolidated.

Multiple Identities

The literature discusses the correlation between maintaining a number of cultural identities and between quality of life. Understanding the state of the individual coping with multiple cultural identities can lead to two contradictory predictions (Ben Shalom & Hornchik, 1999): On one hand, it may be hypothesized that maintaining one identity at the expense of other identities prevents conflicts and therefore contributes to the personal welfare of the individual. On the other hand, maintaining a number of group identities that the individual considers to be positive, can be a source for social, cultural and material resources. In daily life the individual can choose the identity that suits the context in which he is operating, recruiting relevant social support in a manner that assists his

emotional adjustment . Research findings of Ben Shalom & Hornchik (1999, 2000) show that there is a positive correlation between each cultural identity and adjustment. Furthermore, it was found that the more positive identities respondents had, the higher their level of adjustment, both on a psychological level and regarding quality of life in the dormitory. Thoits (1983) also argued that multiple identities were beneficial for the individual. She found a positive correlation between the number of identities that an individual has and between quality of life. According to Thoits, although multiple identities could cause conflicts between roles, it may lower feelings of isolation and provide more meaning to life. The research findings of Ben Shalom & Hornchik (1999, 2000), are in keeping with studies in the literature that show that a consolidated cultural identity is important in aiding adjustment among minorities (Phinney, 1995). Gorney (2000) differentiates between two types of identity, individual identity and collective identity. Individual identity is formed through the individual's limited circles - family and the society in which he is raised. The individual's identity can change over the years through a transition from one culture to another. Collective identity varies based on historical processes, sometimes sharply and very significantly.

I now turn to Israeli reality and problems of identity within Israeli society and the social context in which Druze identity is designed.

The Problem of Identity in the State of Israel

Israel is presently perceived as a state with a western character, but at the same time containing traditional societies whose lifestyle is in contradiction to the western world, such as the Druze. Therefore the

following questions can be asked: What is Druze identity and what does it signify? How is it consolidated under the current circumstances in the state of Israel, characterized by a democratic and multi-cultural regime, coping with the impact of the western world and post-modernist dialogue? At the same time the state has not managed to liberate itself from its Jewish character which places it at odds with other cultural groups within the state which do not belong to this religions group, including the Druze, who are perceived not to be in a conflict with the Jews. This multi-cultural reality can be discerned through the great degree of tension between Jews who struggle to maintain a uniform cultural nature within the state and between Arab groups who demand recognition of an Arab state alongside the ruling Israeli state.

In this context of the politics of identities, I will first discuss the study of identity among the Arab population, to which the Druse sect belongs from a linguistic and social standpoint. In Israeli reality, the Arab population is in strong conflict with the Jewish cultural group because it demands recognition of an independent Arab state alongside Israel. The Arab group is currently threatening the Israeli political order and undermining its security in various ways simultaneously. This group, particularly the Moslem group, is in a constant state of conflict with the Druze group, as seen throughout historical eras. The Moslems' treatment of the Druze in Jordan and Syria is clear, where tolerance has not developed towards the Druze as a religious group, deviating from Islam. This tension is even stronger in light of the good relations existing between the Jews and the Druze of Israel, and the fact that the Druze serve in the security forces.

The Study of Identity Among the Arab Population

Most researchers who addressed to the issue of the identity of the Arab population of Israel agree on two central components of the issue (Alhaj, 1997): The civilian component stemming from the actual status of Arabs as citizens of the state; and the nationalistic component which is a direct result of the national attribution of Arabs in Israel and the Arab world to the Palestinian world. He feels that since the inception of the State, formation of the identities of Arabs in Israel and their attitude towards the state and the Jewish population have been influenced, by four central circles:

a. The local circle, touching on the internal structure of the Arab population and changes that occurred over time in the system of values and patterns of life.

b. The national circle, touching on the status of Arabs in the state and formal policy taken towards the Arabs, in addition to the informal and formal relations with the Jewish majority. (the Arab minority is a non-assimilationist minority, different from the majority regarding nationalism and national identity, ethnic origins, religion, and social demographic attributes). The common perception is that the State of Israel was established by the Jews for the Jews. The Jewish nature of the state is obvious in its symbols, flag, anthem and holidays (Smooha, 1989) and anchored in a number of laws that have entrenched this nature, such as: the Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, the Law of Israeli Lands (Van Lear and the Ministry of Education, 1984). Realization of these laws is in conflict with the democratic nature of the State of Israel, as they determine different measures for Jews and Arabs (Alhaj, 1997).

c. The regional circle, touching on the special cultural and national connection of Arabs in Israel with the Arab world in general, particularly with the Palestinian world.

d. The religious circle, touching on ethnic identity among Moslem, Christians and Druze. The Arab population of Israel is heterogeneous, of which 75% are Moslem, 15% are Christian and 10% are Druze (Israel Statistical Annual, 1991).

Over time, Arabs in Israel developed a special "Palestinian Israeli" identity which includes two central components simultaneously: The Israeli citizen component, and the Palestinian nationalist component. Balancing between these two components is complex and difficult, and perhaps even impossible under existing conditions. Arabs of Israel are forced to cope with a state of continual conflict between their state and between their nation within Israeli political culture, a direct result of the definition of the Israeli state as a Jewish state and not a state for all of its citizens (Alhaj, 1997).

The implications of the political process that began in 1993 regarding Arabs in Israel are complex and varied. On one hand, the Israeli Palestinian dialogue, recognition of the PLO and the creation of the PA have led to a small degree of legitimization of the Palestinian component among a large part of the Israeli population. As a result, the contrast between the nationalistic and civilian components in Israeli Arab identity has dulled. The political process and the start of resolving the national question have also led to positioning the civilian issue and the struggle over the nature of the State of Israel at the head of Israeli Arab priorities. Chanel (1994) differentiates simultaneously between three basic identities that may be relevant to the real life of Israeli Arabs:

Defining themselves as Israeli Arabs and therefore emphasizing their belonging to Israel; perceiving themselves as identifying with the PLO and therefore emphasizing their belonging to the Palestinian nationality; perceiving themselves Israeli and Palestinians, a middle of the road position. Hertz Lazerovitz (1982) found that the group of Arab youth that defines itself as "Israeli Arab" is characterized by a strong family sub-identity, a strong religious sub-identity, and positive attitudes towards school. The group that defines itself as "Palestinian Arab", is characterized by strong sub identities in the following: family, and citizenship (emphasis on the connection to the land of Israel and not the Arab nation).

The complex nature of consolidating identity among the Arabs in Israel is similar in part to the complexity of consolidating the identity of the Druze ethnic group. In order to understand this complexity, it is necessary to first survey the historical background of the Druse sect throughout the world in general, and specifically within the State of Israel.

The Study of Identity among the Druse Ethnic Group

The Druze in History: Approximately one thousand years have passed since the Druze appeared in history as carriers of a new religion and philosophy. In the past, they had lived for a long time under the auspices of the Islamic nation, and only in the 11th century (the time of Kalifa Fatmeh "Alhakam Bamer Allah") they declared themselves as an independent monotheistic sect, separate from Islam (Salah,1989). During this period, at least according to Druze memory, the members of the sect

were forced to sacrifice much blood and be extremely brave, insightful and wily to maintain their physical existence and their unique identity (Falah, 2000). However, if the Druze to not maintain national uniqueness in the accepted meaning of the word, how has this sect managed to maintain its uniqueness and existence through all of the wars and the persecution that they went through over the thousand years of their existence? Some of the factors that are highly important to the continued existence of the Druze are as follows (Falah, 2000):

a. The religious factor: Thanks to the Druze religion and its power, members of the sect have maintained their way of life throughout the years, although only a small number of the sect, called the "Okal" know all the secrets of the religion. Religion was also a helpful source for creating important frameworks to highlight the uniqueness of the religion and to feed its ability to survive, particularly Druze religious law: laws of marriage and divorce, inheritance, bequeathing, etc.

b. The nature of the social regime of most Druze communities in the Middle East is patriarchal, based on a strong family and extended family led by the father of the family and the Sheikh of the extended family. This format is in strong contrast with the growing feministic outlook which has been recently expanding, even among traditional societies, under the influence of modern developments.

c. The long Druze history of persecution created a deep degree of solidarity within the sect. "Hafad El Alhoan" meaning protecting the believing brother, provides religious validation for Druze solidarity. This collective mutuality is reinforced by the important principle that prohibits marrying anyone outside of the sect. The practical significance of this

principle is that the Druze are one large family with stronger and stronger blood ties as the years go by, because if you were not born Druze you cannot join the religion. This brotherhood achieves a level of eternal spiritual significance through the belief in reincarnation - this principle protects the Druze against assimilation, similar to what happened to the Jews in the Diaspora.

d. The system of social values drawing from the religion. This system has undoubtedly contributed to Druze uniqueness: Modesty, telling the truth, bravery, hosting guests, a strong connection to the land (which is one of the most important three basic principles of Druze society: religion, land and respecting women), and agricultural work. This system of relations within Druze society also includes external appearance, particularly among the Druze religious leaders and Druze women.

e. The literary sphere: Despite the importance of Arab literature in the lives of the Druze sect, during the history of the sect, stories of Druze historical characters were created alongside stories of the exemplary way of life of the religious leaders. The stories and acts of the heroes of these stories are raised at various opportunities, and complete the unique way of life of the sect, providing them with unique symbols for their traditions, and connecting them to their Druze heritage.

At the end of the 20th century, as a result of the rise of modern nationalism, some of these unique factors mentioned above have become weaker, and a situation has been created that creates a risk to the continued existence of the sect. Modernization processes through which secular education has expanded and media opportunities have developed, have led to an undermining of the patriarchal regime and religious

authority. Daily contact between members of the Druze sect and members of other ethnic groups - at work, in the military, within society and in other areas - have led the Druze on one hand to become closer to other groups, and on the other hand to look deeply into themselves to clarify the question of what actually sets them apart from their non-Druze counterparts.

The question of the identity and essence of the Druze exists, of course, in all three geographic concentrations of Druze communities within the Middle East (Falah, 2000). According to Falah, the question of identity arises in Israel based on the modern democratic nature of the country, which allows self expression and the ability of the Druze sect to demand equal rights and opportunities to those of the dominant Jewish group. Furthermore, it is a result of the small number of Druze and the affect of numbers on the ability to make decisions and determine policy, and also as a result of the longstanding tension between the Druze and the Moslem Arab group which did not develop tolerance towards the Druze when they deviated from Islam after once being considered a stream of Islam.

The problem of Druze identity among the Druze of Israel arose in the early 1950s, and over time has become worse, until becoming one of the issues that most ignites all parts of the sect. Recently, voices have been heard demanding taking vital steps to reinforce Druze uniqueness. In addition to the fear of assimilation within Israeli society and Arab culture, these voices also express a desire for unique ethnic expression which was not allowed to them during the Turkish and British rule of Israel. These people feel that there has been improvement in Druze status in Israel thanks to good relations with the Jews and their contribution to the State.

They have also found a sympathetic ear among the Jewish public, who understands the Druze as they fight against assimilation and its dangers (Falah, 2000).

In order to emphasize the uniqueness of the Druze, the government has established two committees: a public and a parliamentary committee, to study the reasons for Druze protest and bitterness, in order to improve relations between the Druze and the State of Israel. These two committees paid great attention to the question of education in the Druze sector. Furthermore, the Ben Dor committee saw that there was an urgent need to reinforce Druze awareness through processing a special curriculum for Druze schools. The members of the committee expressed their concern that Druze children do not recognize the history of their sect, religion and traditions. The committee expressed its belief that application of curricula in these areas would help ameliorate the feelings of frustration stemming from identity problems. The Schechterman committee also indicated that it was fatefully important to determine an independent Druze curriculum in order to allow continued existence of the sect (Falah, 2000).

Based on the literature review to this point addressing the development of identity through philosophical, psychological and sociological theories, and based on Israeli reality, identity perceives the individual as a social dialectic and not as a liberal individual. This outlook emphasizes that through the dialogue that the individual maintains with society in which he lives, its values, beliefs, norms and cultural codes, he will form his own identity.

The research population chosen in the present dissertation is based on adolescents belonging to the Druze culture. These youths are students

Learning in two high schools in Israel. The students develop dialectics with their culture in addition to that which takes place within their social lives, within the framework of their formal studies in Heritage lessons. Therefore, the present dissertation will examine the essence of this dialectic and how it is expressed in formation of the identities of Druze adolescents.

The Components of Druze Identity in the Curriculum

The participants in the present research are Druze adolescents studying in two Israeli high schools. These adolescents spend much time within the educational context of their school. Within this educational context there are seemingly attributes of the Druze community and social norms unique to the Druze sect, both overt and covert. The interaction which occurs between the adolescent and the educational school context in which the child participates every day, leaves its mark, in my opinion, over the formation of his personality and identity. Furthermore, the adolescent in the school context learns the subject of Heritage, a compulsory subject, in order to achieve a matriculation certificate.

The aims of the Druze Heritage curriculum indicate that heritage lessons play a central role in forming identity and teaching Druze culture. The cognitive and emotional aims of the Heritage curriculum, according to the Ministry of Education and Culture (2003) are: To familiarize the student with the heritage of the sect and what is typical of it, to know its values, to become familiar with important figures which played a role in the history of the sect. To learn about the good relationship between Druze and others, to know about the connection between Druze heritage and

Other religions and philosophies, old and new. To become familiar with the current reality of the Druze, to be familiar with innovations transpiring in Druze heritage, and new interpretations. To internalize the principles of religion based on belief in one God, speaking the truth, looking out for brothers, the eternal soul, day of judgment, reward and sanctions, justice and choice, accepting fate, commitment towards what is permissible and prohibited. The student should be proud of his heritage, following the paths of good figures, feeling a common fate with members of the sect, identification and solidarity among people. He should respect other religions, and increase his understanding and support of coexistence with others (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2003).

5. Democratic Values

Rotenstreich considers values to be principles of action, a sort of mini-content that lead us to prefer one action over a different course of action. Values are mini-content for which one action that we desire, is more desirable, i.e., it should exist. Peters (1983) notes that the existence of education should be considered only if it is something that is of value when achieved. Education cannot exist without education towards values (Kleinberger, 1976; Oko, 1974). A value is never a means but rather an end in and of itself.

"These are systems of rules and customs that are accepted in a given society for assessing the acts or nature of its members (Kleinberger, 1980). Adar (1976) argues that it is necessary to differentiate between an attitude, which is a direction, or the power of the individual's relationship to a given object , and between a value, which is everything that is

desirable or preferred. Avi-Nun (1978) and Bar-Tal (1987) also discuss the principles of positvity or preference. The definition of values does not stem from a superior power but rather from society, and is connected to society's pressure on the individual.

The only absolute value is the process of life itself (Dewey, 1960). It is important to have the outlook according to which a value is not only what is desirable but what we think is also good and worthwhile, i.e., that it fulfills the criterion of value and also the criterion of morality. There is no such thing as a real norm or an ideal norm, there is nothing normal, but rather normative. Ilutz (1973) identifies the concept "values" with the concept of quantity, and therefore in general, values are a process leading to an examination of the school's output based on values and merchandise.

We see that there is no single definition for "values" (Avi-Nun, 1978), and every definition of value is very general and abstract (Ben-Peretz & Kramer, 1982).

Values may be classified according to different fields. Rogers (1973) proposes a division into operational values that are not cognitive, and conceptual values that include assessments regarding symbolic concepts. A different type of differentiation is made between content or material values and formational or formative values. Content values such as loyalty to the homeland are absolutely clear, whereas a formative value such as bravery can be interpreted differently by different people (Kleinberger, 1961). According to Adar (1976) every type of classification has some implication over moral education in school. Every moral perception contains two dimensions: the emotional and cognitive dimensions. The cognitive dimension immediately raises the

question of the validity of values, since the individual must decide what guidelines to use to decide to prefer a given value. The question of the relativity of values is concerned with the possibility of the existence of universal values that are not connected to a certain time and place, versus the argument that every value depends on a specific time, place and society. Every society, whether pluralistic or not, has different moral perceptions and public debate regarding values. This debate creates dynamics in values and then, of course, raises the question of the right to educate towards values. Our generation is a generation of confusion, and this confusion exists in all societies (Rogers, 1973; Rotenstreich, 1964; Kleinberger, 1980; Lavi, 1988). This confusion creates a need for agreement regarding the right to educate towards values.

According to Kleinberger (1980) the theoretical approach that a value statement can be valid in one group of social circumstances but incorrect and invalid under different circumstances and in different societies, leads to relating to only some values as absolute values. This latter type of values are an expression of human insight, not the insight of the individual but insights of humanity as a whole. On a higher level, when getting to the principles of morals, their validity cannot be explained by rational means and therefore they must either be accepted or rejected in an act of faith.

Rotenstreich opposes this approach, and his opinion, the question of variety of justice, equality and tolerance exist only when there is a society and society forces a certain form of values on the individual, controlling the individual's ethnocentric approach. Regarding the issue of obligatory values, Rotenstreich says that it is necessary to differentiate between

moral principles and the interpretation of these principles in the law. Wright (1982) estimates that values can be eternal and universal, but their intentions are always changing within society.

According to the democratic outlook the right to educate towards obligatory values stems from the fact that these values are accepted by most members of society. In a democratic regime the majority rules and decides what the aims and values according to which children should be educated are. According to Avi-Nun (1978) education towards values is not necessary, and even more so, education that is not directed toward cultivating the values of the individual in his social life, should not be called education. It is necessary to educate towards values as a measure of actions or for assessment of actions. Livingstone (1960) and Whitehead (1958) do not see the possibility for the existence of education without moral education, or as Whitehead says, moral education is impossible without a vision of greatness that turns into habit.

Klienberger (1961) admits that in the end there is a right to educate towards obligatory values. However, from a philosophical standpoint he argues for the lack of right to educate towards obligatory values. However, reality does not allow us to avoid educating towards obligatory values. Therefore Rotenstreich answers him that it is obligatory for individuals to exist who reach a level in which they may decide between obligatory values. The educator must only warn not to educate toward dogmatism out of belief in values and must not educate towards being arbitrary out of a belief in authority. Lamm (1986) understands that it is impossible to achieve the value of truth, the main value of any culture, without development of the intellect and formation of character, which

is accomplished through education. He agrees that there is a risk in education, but it is impossible to give up the risk that education towards values. Although not it is not clear how the individual will choose his path, society must educate towards values.

The right to educate toward values also stems from the fact that the school does not operate in a vacuum, and sometimes its power is weaker than the power of other agents. As a remedy to this weakness Frankenstein (1987) proposes principles for education towards values, which are mainly increasing the awareness of the individual regarding his weaknesses and in this way, preventing those weaknesses from taking over.

In contradiction to this battery of theorists who support the right to educate and even the obligation to educate towards values there are a number of theoreticians who doubt the right of society to educate towards obligatory values. The central stream of thought arguing against education towards value is the radical stream of education. They place autonomy as the only value that society must educate towards.

Yizhar (1975) is the most vociferous theoretician in Israel who opposes the right to educate towards values. Not only does one not have to educate towards values, but it is also impossible to do so. If we leave an uneducated child, there will be purpose to his life. Education is from a position in which society wants a person to be without identity, to belong, at the end of the educational process, to groups even without needing permission to choose. True education is the individual's freedom to live as well as he can, according to his personal desire, as he chooses.

This survey of the arguments for and against education towards values leads to the conclusion that this determination will always be subjective.

Either the situation is created that educational action will force itself on the student drawing from accepted ideologies expressing society's need to educate the child and not the need of the child to be educated (Lamm, 1986), or the student will first have to express his agreement so that the value will become obligating and therefore, there is no right to educate towards values (Yizhar, 1975).

Kleinberger recommends solving this dilemma by placing responsibility on the individual educator and the entire system. They must find the balance between reinforcing the internal confidence of the personality and between cultivating strength of will, to doubt and struggle with problems; between insurance of public unity and between encouraging the individuals intellectual initiative. An additional conclusion is that it is necessary to change the expression of education towards values to an expression of education towards assessment in such a way that the individual learns to use consideration and to avoid propaganda and indoctrination.

The School and Democratic Values

The school is very important, also because of the fact that the student who is in school is in the midst of critical stages of his life, the years in which the individual's image is formed and achieves its final form of expression. This is a period in which the individual leaves the protected hothouse of the home to the open world, where his autonomy must be allowed full expression. This is a time of moral development in which opinions, forms of behavior and basic approaches of the individual are designed (Hess & Tornoy,1967; Kohlberg & Trial, 1972; ; Jennings & Niemi, 1974).

The school holds a great advantage over other systems by the fact that it provides knowledge and skills and also serves as a tool for education towards values. Therefore the school supercedes the family which cannot provide the individual with experiences that are suitable for becoming familiar with and understanding the political sphere (Driven, 1970; Zidkiyahu, 1988; Almond & Verba, 1963; Ichilov, 1984). For Peters (1966) experience in democracy is a necessary prerequisite for the democratic method of government, and the entire idea of education towards democracy depends on this. The role of school in the process of education towards democracy must be emphasized, as it is the only place that allows such experiences.

Sullivan et al. (1975) hypothesize that school equips the individual student with thinking skills and knowledge so that students can handle political phenomena more complexly and abstractly. Ehman (1980) lists a series of studies that were conducted in the US and Canada which generally show the important role of the school as a socialization agent. This series of studies determined that knowledge is the most central thing the school provides to children, less than sharpening of political attitudes or the creation of involvement. This is a logical finding that emphasizes the cognitive product of school in the United States. Nevertheless, the formal educational plan helps in creating and forming attitudes and political awareness. Torney et al. (1975) conducted a study in ten countries, including the United States and Israel. They concluded that school is the most important socialization agent in all areas related to attitudes that describe citizens or good citizenship.

Zidkiyahu (1988) examines the way schools cope with the issue of democracy on two interconnected levels. One level is academic, through

specific civics curricula and through other subjects. The other level is the behavioral level, which is everything defined as the covert curriculum. Peters (1966) proposes not to require the school to do more than it is able. Therefore the school must realistically examine its methods in the field of education towards democracy, and just do as much as it can. Levy & Gutman (1974) examined a sample of 5000 secular and religious youths on the issue of good citizenship, before the Yom Kippur War. They concluded that the school provides a possible contribution for designing youths' attitudes towards things that "should not be done". 83% of the respondents said that school should educate towards good civics, although most of them feel that school deals mainly with academic requirements. The value of tolerance was perceived as a political value (Kohlberg, 1972). The problem is that an individual cannot learn tolerance if he is not aware of the fact that he lacks tolerance. Shamir & Sullivan (1985) examined the value of tolerance which they consider to be an important value, particularly in societies that are under pressure. They found a correlation between ideology and dogmatism and between tolerance.

Ben-Peretz and Kramer (1982) found a series of problems in the field of realizing education towards values. One of the problems that is raised is how the principle of education towards values is implemented through traditional curricula. Kohlberg and Gillian (1975) are concerned by the fact that new curricula are based on the existence of formal operational thought instead of the attempt to develop this type of thought. Their recommendation is to develop curricula as tools for the development of moral thought and principles. Howe (1987) also shoots down curricula.

He feels that curricula are constructe such that they are able to contribute very little in the field of education towards values. Firer (1986) feels that curricula in the field of civics must go through a reform in principle and also structurally and qualitatively. Civics curricula are lacking in that they emphasize knowledge and a description of institutions of government. Frankenstein (1987) feels that instead of describing governmental institutions, it is necessary to deal with problems of civic behavior and organizational and legal questions.

Jones (1980) criticizes the overt curriculum in Britain. Here too he sees a problem of bias and a risk of indoctrination regarding a certain type of teacher, in the name of freedom given to them by apolitical discipline, or the risk that teachers will only teach facts about the system.

A number of studies have been conducted on the impact of the Civics curriculum over students' political attitudes. The assumption is that Civics studies should provide the ability to think critically about institutions, organizations and events in the sphere of society and state. In a large number of studies, researchers concluded that Civics courses led to minor changes, or to no changes at all in students' perceptions of democracy (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Tap & Kohlberg, 1971; Patrick, 1972; Sigal & Hoskin, 1981).

Massialas (1972, 1975) criticizes the ability of curricula to change attitudes, showing research results from 14 countries worldwide.

The conclusion that may be consolidated from the research itemized above, is that political education does have some impact in the long term over democratic perceptions of students. The next chapter will attempt to examine the degree of impact of the Civics curriculum over attitudes of Druse students in Israeli high schools.

Good Civics

As a result of the many changes that have occurred in Israeli society, there has been a need for education towards good civics within the agenda of the educational community.

At the beginning of 1995, the Ministry of Education appointed a steering committee headed by Professor Kremnitzer, of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University, with the participation of Hebrew and Arab educators and educators from the religious-public schools. The aim was to develop a comprehensive program to teach the main points of civics to students as a common moral and behavioral basis for all citizens of the country. The committee was asked to address the following issues in its work:

a) The civic values and civics skills that the student must acquire over the course of his studies; b) The civic values and skills that can be taught at each of the stages of learning, and inclusion of this program together with civics in high school; c) The organizational frameworks by which it will be possible to promote this program in all educational institutions in Israel.

The committee presented an interim report with recommendations both in the theoretical educational sphere and the practical sphere. In the theoretical-educational sphere, the committee touched on a variety of aspects of civics education, the nature of relations between citizens of the country, human relations between citizens, human respect and liberty, preventing separation and social isolation, and balancing all of the needs of the individual with needs of society. The committee called to educate towards tolerance and recognition of pluralism. In the practical sphere, the committee addressed the issue of civics as a comprehensive process

composed of both theoretical study, and the acquisition of attitudes, values and motivation to act. The approach that combines civics studies in application in the school assumes that there is no chance to teach attitudes by preaching or instructing. The correct way is through dialogue that will encourage students to think about the implications of anti-democratic attitudes over the principle of generalization and universalization of arguments. Furthermore, the report called on the educational system to coordinate efforts that must be made simultaneously in the family, neighborhood, community, community centers, youth movements and other social organizations, in the public and private media, on the level of symbolism and government ceremonies, and on the level of the messages transmitted by the country's leaders.

It may be said that the Kremnitzer report discussed a serious and comprehensive change in Civics education, including, among other things, an increased schedule of studies in Civics, a new curriculum, and teacher training, but its main innovation was recognition that success in education towards democratic citizenship depends on a comprehensive educational procedure spread among all areas of learning, including the development of a proper climate in the school allowing students to continually experience civic values and internalize them, experiencing civics skills.

The present dissertation aims to investigate how school promotes education towards good civics.

Citizenship and its Connection to Education

In order to be able to determine measures for examining the issue and assessing it, I will first address the definition of the concept "citizenship" and its development into the attributes of good citizenship and the connection between education and civics.

The concept of citizenship is a complex term that includes many dimensions within the collective and personal spheres. The term has different meanings, reflecting different uses.

First of all, it is a concrete empirical and descriptive term, in that citizenship relates to a series of particular obligations and rights given to citizens in a certain country. Second of all, citizenship may be considered an analytical term, in that citizenship includes the protection that the country provides to its citizens and the opportunities that it creates for them in the realm of political participation (Janowitz, 1980).

However, the many changes that human society has been through and is going through have led to changes in the meaning, complexity and attributes of the concept. Citizenship has been a continual human social need for the past 2500 years, since the times of Ancient Greece developing through the era of the modern national state. Good citizens must be people who want to act in a way that will lead to benefit for their community, that will make them good citizens (Oliver & Heather, 1994). According to Janowitz (1980) citizenship is a moral judgment. In order to be called a good citizen, the individual must judge the morality of his personal behavior. This hints that the individual must ensure his cooperative interest and its welfare. Macedo (1990) argues that good citizenship is expressed in reasonable participation in civic activity, signs

of tolerance and respect for others' rights, and self control. Petten (1988, in Oliver & Heather, 1994) also defines the concept similarly. However, he places more emphasis on involvement to improve community life.

Levinston (in Lamm, 1963) argues that good citizenship is more than participating in elections, paying taxes and fulfilling national obligations. It also involves all activities that the individual performs relating to his fellow citizens, and which affect the health and normal running of the country. Good citizenship includes all of the requirements of the law, but also many obligations that are not demanded, and are up to the individual's discretion. Good citizenship is practical and not theoretical, active and not passive, an art and not theory. It is the art of living within society. A good citizen is like a good soldier, learning to feel and to act as an organ of a living body. He participates in this body and when necessary sacrifices his private welfare and sometimes his life. The citizen fulfills his obligations to his country out of free will and not coercion (Heather, 1990).

The literature review allows derivation of the general assumption of the present dissertation, that citizenship is the legal connection of the individual to his country and land, a connection that is determined through obligations and rights towards the country. Citizenship is connected to common history and shared symbols, such as an anthem and a flag, and depends on a political institutional infrastructure and a social-cultural infrastructure. Citizenship includes three clusters of rights:

1) rights necessary for individual freedom such as the right to a just trial and freedom of opinion and belief;

2) political rights, the main ones being the right of the citizen to

participate in the governing of the country;

3) a group of social-economic rights including among other things, the right to receive services in education, health, and residence, social services, welfare services, and the right to hold property. In addition, the citizen must be subordinate to the authority of the state.

There is a connection between education and citizenship which is expressed in two main aspects: the need to teach the necessary skills for active and responsible civil life and the need for maintaining the strength of the democratic regime.

Theoretical debate regarding the connection between education and citizenship is ancient and has been going on since the days of the Ancient Greek philosophers. The Greek philosopher Plato wrote: "What we have in our thought is education from childhood towards values, training that creates a strong desire to become perfect citizens". Aristotle believed that the individual is naturally constructed to live in political communities, but this natural potential must be designed by the cooperative and educational influence that create the true citizen (Heather, 1990; Oliver & Heather, 1994). In the early modern age, Machiavelli and Rousseau both recognized the importance of education in increasing civic spirit. Rousseau saw a goal of education towards citizenship as habituating citizens to upholding laws, equality, brotherhood, competition, and living according to the outlook of brother citizens, desiring public consensus. Heather (1990) argues that the differences that citizenship includes much be learned and become part of culture. Therefore no one can be a full citizen without being educated for the role.

Lamm (1992) argues that in order to be a citizen in a democratic society it

is necessary to learn, and this does not mean cognitive recognition of the laws of democracy, but rather the formation of characteristics, i.e. educating the personality. This is out of the assumption that positive experience in school accompanied by internalization of values, will lead to applying this experience in adult life (Peters, 1983).

Neuberger (1992) emphasizes the importance of experience and learning and argues that it is not possible to develop a democratic personality that is not tolerant, moderate, compromising, and having social trust. These attributes are learned in the educational system. Since democracy is more than a form of government it is a way of life, it is acquired through an educational process of combined experiences (Dewey, 1960). Only a methodical educational process can teach the necessary skills for complex life in democratic society, such as the ability to make rational decisions, to choose between alternatives and to accept personal responsibility (Damico, 1980; Gruber, 1971).

Lindman (1956, in: Zidkiyahu, 1986) found that attitudes of youth towards democracy are emotional and include the component of social desirability. On the other hand, arguments against democracy are more rational. This finding is in keeping with other findings that indicate a non-uniform perception of democratic principles. On one hand, most youngsters express a positive attitude towards democracy in general, and they have internalized democracy as majority rule. On the other hand, when asked to express their opinions regarding specific democratic values, they tend to have reservations regarding democracy as the preferred way of life or limit it with reservations regarding some democratic values (Levy, Rapaport & Rimor, 1978; Zemach & Zin, 1984;

Hasin, 1984; Ichilov, Bartal & Mazaway, 1987; The Van Lear Institute, 1987; Almog, 1990; Zellman & Sears, 1973).

Additional studies have discovered an ethnocentric trend regarding willingness to apply full civic rights; difficulty applying the principles of democracy universally in problematic situations; and a low level of tolerance which focuses mainly on various groups such as groups identified with the left and Arabs in Israel (Ichilov, Bartal & Mazaway, 1987; Zemach, 1986; Shamir & Sullivan, 1985). Furthermore findings of studies that examined civic orientations in Israel were partially encouraging and partially worrying. Many educators found a high frequency of collectivist and nationalistic orientations among youths in different groups within Israel, expressed in attitudes of respect to the nation and the homeland, justification of the existence of the state, a desire to live in the state, a desire to act for the state's security, and a desire to volunteer to the army (Levy & Gutman, 1976; Adler & Peres, 1968 in: Ichilov, 1995; Ichilov, Hyman & Shapira, 1988). Alongside these findings, other studies report a weakening of the connection to the collective which emphasizes the benefit of the group, and a rise in the importance of orientations that give preference to achievement and personal success. An example of this can be found in studies that reported mixed morals regarding leaving the country, making leaving the country into a partially legitimate step when the aim is personal success and promotion of the individual (Etzioni-Halevi & Shapira, 1974; in Ichilov, 1989).

The studies surveyed above indicate that, in fact, most respondents express a positive attitude towards democracy and consider it to the

preferred method of government. However, this has not been sufficiently internalized, perceiving democracy as a method of rule that centers on the Individual who is free to design and develop his personality as an individual within society, while protecting the rights of various groups within society. Furthermore a weakness was seen in internalizing universal values as expressed, among other things in attitudes towards Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox, and freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

Education is one of the basic values of a democratic philosophy which supports equality of all citizens in all areas of life, including equal opportunities in education, which aims to allow every individual in society to develop and realize his full hidden potential. Education towards citizenship in a democracy is necessary for the existence of the democracy, as only with the aid of a methodical educational process can the complex skills necessary for living an active and responsible civilian life in a democratic society be taught (Cohen, Shmida & Zidkiyahu, 1985).

Based on research findings, Kremnitzer (1996) sees a great need for comprehensive education towards citizenship as an important and first degree factor behind ensuring the strength and quality of the democratic regime while creating commitment of citizens towards the democratic idea and creating willingness among citizens to be active responsible citizens. The correlation between democracy and education has often been perceived as a correlation between democracy and school although democracy is only part of the educational process in general, and part of the process of education towards citizenship that occurs, not only in

school. The reasons for the correlation between democracy education and school are complex and are related to, among other things, the centrality of school in society, and the correlation between education and democracy. The school is the central factor behind the educational process towards citizenship and democracy, as school places responsibility for training the younger generation to live in a democratic society, on the school (Hess & Horney, 1967; Peled, 1976).

School and Society

The basic role of school is socialization. Socialization towards citizenship in a democratic society aims to help the individual adopt norms and values that are accepted in society. As part of this role, the school must provide the child with civic knowledge, so that he will be able to take part in government and fulfill his civic roles, equipping the student with tools allowing him to examine events, attitudes and information that flow through a democratic society. Since school represents society or part of it, it is given the role of training the younger generation for readiness to enter adult society, with all of its obligations, and with basic skills that will help the individual fit into society and contribute to its stability in the future. Commitment means accepting values of society at large and taking a certain defined part in society. Within the socialization process the school provides youngsters with knowledge, values of the community in which they live, social behavioral patterns, and ideals that are vital for fulfilling their roles in adult society, both regarding motivation necessary for fulfilling these roles, and regarding technical knowledge necessary for these roles (Parson, 1959;

Peters, 1966; Kneller, 1970; Hern, 1990; Fishman, 1978).

Bitwill (1965) considers the school to be a social unit which was given the role of providing a service, in this case moral and technical socialization of youngsters. This assumption means that the central goal of the school is to prepare students for status as adults through providing knowledge, skills and practice of moral attributes that are necessary for adult roles. Furthermore, the school must teach its students a basic level of civic skills that will include, among other things knowledge and abilities to make laws common to adult society in general. Two main sociological theories present the correlation between school and society.

1. The Functional Theory -

This theory was developed by Kerr, Clark and Parsons and argues that education in school is an effective and rational means for choosing talented people and their choices. In other words, schools help the creation of equal opportunity society in which effort and ability determine the individual's status more than family background. The function that the school fulfills, based on the functional theory is, the creation of intellectual skills, classification and choosing skills, and consolidation of citizenship based on knowledge. According to the functional theory, schools create what may be generally called modern attitudes and values. The school teaches qualities and very general attitudes that help in performing effective roles in modern society. Therefore, the school's main contribution is learning social norms that the family is unable to transmit (Dreebin, 1968; Parsons, 1959). The school transmits situationally dependent standards of behavior, i.e., principles,

assumptions or expectations that show how an individual should act under defined conditions. The school contributes to learning norms and their nature, and in this way prepares the student to enter the adult world.

2. The Critical Theory -

This theory emphasizes the connection between schools and the demands of elitist social groups, and not the needs of society in general. Furthermore, this theory emphasizes the connection between school education and obedience and submission more than the acquisition of cognitive skills . Therefore, this theory considers the school to be an institution that serves the interests of elitist social groups that maintain inequality and cultivate attitudes that encourage accepting the given situation (Hern, 1990). The central idea behind the theory of Bowles and Gintis is that schools serve the interest of a capitalistic order in modern society. Schools reproduce values and personal attitudes that are necessary in a repressive capitalist society. Schools must control students and make them submit to ensure the existence of an effective disciplined work force, and in this way they encourage passive and uncritical citizenship. Similarly, Randel and Collins argue that from a historical standpoint, the main function of the school has been to teach the culture of status groups more than to teach useful skills. Most schools in most societies are given the task of transmitting ideal values and measures of a certain social group, generally the ruling group or the elite group within society (Hern, 1990).

In conclusion, it maybe concluded from sociological theories that schools basically provide narrow training for the role of a citizen, emphasizing

the formal aspects of the structure of government and attributing more importance to the passive dimensions of the role of the citizen, without cultivating students' abilities to cope with complex reality. School in a democratic society must provide students with all the components of the role of the citizen. Students must be trained to cope with possible conflicts within and between the roles of being a citizen in order to be able to decide between alternatives in a mature and autonomous manner. The school's obligation is to expose citizens of the future to a series of models of democratic citizenship so that they may choose the most appropriate model for themselves (Ichilov, 1993; Ben Amotz, 1987; Wyn, 1995; Benjamin Paul, 1997).

The School as a Central Agent of Education Towards Citizenship

A number of socialization agents participate in the process of education towards citizenship and formation of a political orientation in a democratic society: the family, the school, the peer group, and the media; despite recognition that these agents' roles are important in teaching values of democracy and political awareness, particularly the family (Ichilov, 1984; Hyman, 1959; Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Zellman & Sears, 1971; Niemi, 1973).

Many researchers emphasize the central role of the school in the process of educating towards citizenship in a democratic society. The centrality of the school in Israel in the above mentioned process is more obvious than in other countries because of the role that school plays in consolidating the heterogeneous population of Israeli society and because of the weakness of many families in Israel as socialization agents (Adar,

1953). The centrality of the school is even more obvious in light of the growing weakness of youth movements beginning in the 1960s, which were not a central factor anymore in educating children toward citizenship and a political orientation within democratic society (Barzel, 1974).

Many researchers emphasize the central role of the school in the educational process toward citizenship in democratic society. One of the main reasons for this is the school's ability, with the tools it has at hand, to create a socialization process that is suitable with its nature. The role of the school stems from other causes. The school is the educational arm of the country. It is able to be influenced. It has professional staff and they have tools and educational programs. Actually the school plays a role in providing attitudes, social perceptions and beliefs regarding the activity of the political method (Hess & Thorney, 1967).

The school is a system that is more given to central control and direction than other socialization systems. A uniform curriculum may be determined, or it may be ensured that only certain types of people with specific ideological orientations are trained to work at schools (Ichilov, 1984; Peters, 1979 in: Zidkiyahu, 1988). Weisberg (1974 in Ichilov, 1984) argues that despite the infrastructure of family influence which the student brings to school, the school can redesign social and political attitudes. The school represents a miniature society that is parallel in structure to broader society, and therefore for every area of life in society, there is a parallel area of life in school. Therefore, the school can be a workshop for experiences that typify civic life in society. Active student communities can be developed in which members learn to live as citizens

with rights and obligations (Dewey, 1960; Eyler, 1977). Despite general agreement regarding the main status of the school in political education, various research results that are concerned with the influence of schools over youths' attitudes towards the political system and civic orientations, are not unequivocal. Hess & Horney (1967) point out the difficulty in measuring the impact of schools, as students are given to a wide variety of influences from other entities, such as: family, the media, and peer group. These may neutralize the influence of school somewhat.

Researchers who consider school to be the main agents of political education base themselves of the fact that there is a correlation between years of education and knowledge, attitudes and patterns of behavior in the political sphere. Among other things, it has been found that political knowledge, political interest, trust in people, and volunteer activity in public and political organizations, all rise with a rise in the number of years of education (Hess & Thorney, 1967; Dreeben, 1970).

As previously mentioned most researchers support the approach that emphasizes the important role of the school in the political education process. Even researchers who do not clearly indicate the school as a central factor in this process testify to its importance. This importance is based on viewing the school as representing a direct and conscious effort of society to teach the younger generation cultural heritage. Schools cope with the issue of education towards democracy on the intellectual academic plane, through programs that are taught in various lessons. Furthermore they cope on the behavioral plane through an attempt to invite opportunities for students in civic processes and a democratic life, through creating a democratic civic climate in the school. Topics related

to education towards citizenship in democratic society that are expressed in all lessons concerning the social sciences and particularly History and Civics studies can be a source of information and also a method of education towards active citizenship. This information will be a basis for good civics (Hepburn, 1983; Beck, 1992; Lipset, 1972).

Researchers who examined Civics curricula and study materials in the United States found that they are not suited to achieving the aims of civics education because they emphasize the structural and legislative aspects of government and do not encourage criticism and independent thought. They avoid touching on controversial issues (Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Massialas, 1972). A number of researchers who examined the impact of curricula over civics education concluded that their contribution to citizenship is low. Remy (1972) who examined the correlation between education and democracy and between curricula taught to graduates of American schools when they were students, found that 40-60% of the graduates indicated that the subjects they learned in school were not relevant to reality, did not include new knowledge in the social sciences sphere, did not discuss controversial issues, did not compare democratic regimes to other political methods, and did not provide practical skills necessary for a citizen in democratic society.

Other studies show that the subjects learned in Civics lessons have only a small impact over students' knowledge of political issues, their political attitudes and their social behavior (Patrick, 1988; Langton & Jennings, 1968; Elam, 1984).

Ichilov (1984) reported that American researchers (Tap, 1971; Patrick, 1972) concluded that although Civics lessons are supposed to provide

abilities for analyzing legal, moral and public problems, their contribution in this context is slim. Wyn (1995) argues that the contribution of Civics lessons in their current format is small because education towards citizenship focuses on providing formal and apolitical information, cultivation of the image of a loyal, passive citizen who perceives his rights as a citizen as limited, and the main role of the citizen as being one who obeys laws. These research findings encourage the question: Is it possible to educate towards citizenship in a democracy using school curricula and study materials?

Researchers disagree regarding this question. Some argue that education toward citizenship in a democracy cannot occur solely through educational curricula (Hess, 1968; Thorney, Oppenheim & Farnen, 1975). On the other hand, Kohlberg (1970) argues that the student can use principles that he learns about democracy in order to address practical political questions, assuming the study material also contains experiential elements such as problem solving, decision making and role playing. Schools in Israel, like in many other countries, cope with the issue of education towards citizenship on two planes: the academic-intellectual plane, which addresses direct learning of topics concerning education towards citizenship; and the behavioral plane, which includes social activities and extra-curricular activities through school. The Civics curriculum (for example, those of 1968, 1971, and 1985) presented these two planes alongside each other. On the intellectual plane emphasis is placed on understanding the main idea behind democracy. On the behavioral plane, emphasis is on the process of choosing events in students' lives according to the values of democracy, and applying the

principles of democracy in the field of informal education both in school and in students' social lives. The issues related to education towards citizenship in a democracy are expressed in most subjects studied in Israeli schools, in History, Geography, Literature and Civics (Ichilov, 1988). Addressing these issues takes place in homeroom classes also, where academic and behavioral planes are addressed simultaneously, and also sometimes through applying unique curricula addressing education towards democracy and political education (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1985, 1992).

The main study topics that should reinforce civics education are social studies and history lessons. Curricula and study materials reflect the social "credo" regarding the essence of citizenship in a democracy.

The stated aim of Civics studies is increasing knowledge regarding political institutes and procedures, education towards loyalty, active citizenship and participation, and increasing individual awareness regarding civic obligations and rights of oneself and others (Ministry of Education, 1971, 1986, 1994). Within the framework of social studies, goals have been set similar to those in Civics studies. Among other things, these goals include: familiarity with ideological approaches that could help understand the State of Israel as a democratic country, familiarity with the individual's ability to affect what occurs in the state; openness and tolerance towards other opinions, showing a positive attitude towards the values of democracy while developing a critical approach towards what occurs; and willingness to fulfill obligations as a citizen, along with standing up for one's rights (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1985). Within the framework of History studies, aims have been

determined regarding education towards democracy as cultivating understanding and tolerance towards the feelings, traditions and way of life of other people and nations, and cultivating the ability to judge historical events based on general human moral values. Furthermore, the various meanings of the values of freedom and equality are examined in various cultures, along with attempts to fulfill these values in reality in various ways (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1985). Despite the centrality of the issue of education towards citizenship and democracy in various curricula, it seems that their application in the educational system comes up short . This critique addresses various aspects of the process.

However, the current survey will focus on topics and study materials that are part of the formal Civics curricula, based on their connection to the topic of the present dissertation, and based on the fact that these are the central tool for providing knowledge, skills and values to the younger generation (Ichilov, 1988). The government-run nature of schools in Israel has been neutralized from any political connection, and the desire to emphasize what unifies and is common has been expressed in education towards citizenship and social education in general. An analysis of the study materials dealing with education towards citizenship in a democracy shows that there is broad agreement within the public that one must discuss social issues in principle and abstractly avoiding their concrete representations, particularly those that are controversial (Ichilov, 1988; Firer, 1987; Yuval, 1984).

In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards openness in presenting a broader variety of issues in the curriculum, such as: Jewish-Arab relations; religious-secular relations, etc. (Ichilov & Naveh, 1979;

Ichilov, 1984). However, in a study conducted by Ichilov (1986) among civics and social science teachers in high school, teachers were asked to cite the issues that are emphasized and neglected in civics education. It was found that teachers emphasized topics that represented the structural legal aspect of government such as government, courts and the voting method. Neglected topics represented universal values such as: tolerance, equality of the sexes, keeping the law, and also nationalistic aspects such as love of the nation and land, absorbing immigration, and respect for the symbol, flag and anthem. Only 23% of the teachers asked agreed absolutely with the statement that Civics textbooks are suited to the needs of Civics education. Only 29% of the teachers agreed partially.

A number of studies have examined the impact of unique curricula regarding democracy, education towards democracy and peaceful coexistence that are taught in schools. Studies have found that either these curricula do not affect the students' attitudes towards the subjects or that they slightly increase the students' degree of tolerance (Dahaf Institute and Van Lear Institute, 1987; Harel, 1994).

These research findings, like the findings of previously conducted research in other countries, raise the question, too: Is it possible to provide education towards citizenship in a democracy using study materials and curricula? The behavioral plane of the school is the accepted sphere for social education, or social moral education. This also includes the emotional plane. Social education addresses all events occurring in school and is a factor behind determining the educational social climate of the school. Within this realm, it supports providing all students with opportunities to belong to social frameworks on a

democratic basis (Shmida, 1979). Israeli researchers, similarly to their colleagues in other countries, found that there is a correlation between democratic experiences occurring in schools and between the attitudes of students regarding democracy. Zidkiyahu (1988) found differences between students on the student council and students who were not, with regards to their attitudes towards democracy in society and toward democracy in school. Students within the student council had more positive attitudes.

In contrast to the above, Goldberg (1998) found that there was no difference in the knowledge and attitudes of students learning in a democratic school toward democracy and that of students who did not learn in democratic schools, because in both cases, students presented positive attitudes towards democracy.

These findings may testify that experiencing a democratic way of life does not necessarily develop more general democratic attitudes, only democratic attitudes in specific areas. On the other hand, in schools in which there is no democratic experience, schools still manage to present the importance of democracy and develop positive attitudes in general among the students.

Despite the findings noted above, researchers in Israel have drawn conclusions regarding the importance of the existence of a democratic civic climate in schools. It is an inseparable part of education towards citizenship in a democratic society (Zidkiyahu, 1986, 1988; Goldberg, 1988; Ichilov, 1984; Schmuck & Shmuck, 1978). This conclusion is in keeping with the official position of the Ministry of Education, that developing and cultivating a democratic citizen will be done not only

through learning democracy but also through applying it in practice (Ministry of Education, 1985, 1997).

In conclusion, school is perceived as the main agent of education towards citizenship and as representing the purposeful and conscious efforts of society to teach cultural heritage to students. This perception of the school is common to all societies. Schools are agents of social, civic, moral and theoretical training. They create commitment to values of work life and social values in the adult world. The content of education covers all aspects of culture and serves the goals of the entire socialization process (Brubacher, 1965; Shifman, 1978).

The central role of school in the process of educating towards citizenship in a democratic society stems from many reasons. The main reason is the fact that school is a miniature social framework (Dewey, 1960), which contains all of the attributes of civic and political life within society. Education towards citizenship in school takes place on two planes: the academic plane and the behavioral plane.

In 1995, The Minister of Education appointed the Kremnitzer committee with the aim of developing a comprehensive program for teaching citizenship to students as a moral and behavioral basis that is common to all citizens of the state (Kremnitzer, 1996). The committee determined the civic values and skills that students should develop over the course of their studies. In 2000, the Department of Curricula of the Ministry of Education published a new Civics textbook, "Being Citizens in Israel". The book was written in accordance with the recommendations of the Kremnitzer committee in all areas regarding study content. It is a book used by all students in high schools in Jewish, Arab and Druse schools.

The aim is to create a common denominator for all students who study in the educational system and are going to be adult citizens in Israel, as stated in the Kremnitzer report.

Education towards citizenship and democracy plays a central role in the worldview of Israeli society and the Israeli educational system. In the early years after the founding if the state, education towards citizenship and democracy was already perceived as one of the two main goals of Israeli society (Adar, 1953). The nature of citizenship studies in Israel has been affected by public debate and Israeli reality in various eras. Over the years, efforts have been made by the educational system to strengthen education towards citizenship and democracy in schools, whether in social education or as part of the curriculum. The most recent

significant expression of the importance of this issue in the educational system was in the appointment of the Kremnitzer committee in 1995 with the aim of creating a comprehensive program for teaching citizenship. The recommendations of the committee that were presented in 1996 were adopted fully by the Ministry of Education, and the conclusions are expressed in instructions given by the Ministry to all schools, both as regards social education and the Civics curriculum.

Despite the importance attributed to developing a civic climate and creating democratic experiences in schools in the conclusions of the Kremnitzer committee and documents of the Ministry of Education, and despite the trend of schools in recent years to cultivate a civic climate and allow democratic experiences within school walls, studies that have examined the issue discovered that schools educate towards obedience

And discipline, and do not operate democratically. In light of these

findings, and based on the centrality of education towards citizenship and democracy in the educational system, there is a **strong need to examine how the school educates towards and promotes civic education and education towards good citizenship specifically**.

Peace

The peace process with the Palestinians has been long and tiring, and has lasted for many years already. The first real step that created a window of hope was the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. From that point in time, negotiations have been taking place between the Israelis and Palestinians, despite many crises. Each of the sides is convinced that it is doing its best to achieve a final resolution of the conflict which will end in a permanent agreement. It is always felt that it is the other side that is creating barriers in the process. Each side attempts to broadcast interest in peace, but what do they mean when they say "peace"?

The research literature that addresses the perception of the concept of peace identifies different meanings and perceptions for this term (Hakvoort & Oppenheimer, 1998). One of the most common discernments made has been between perceiving peace as a positive peace and perceiving peace as a negative peace. A positive peace means a form of harmonious cooperation between groups or nations. Negative peace means defining peace through negativity - a lack of escalation and a lack of physical violence between groups or nations. Oboodait (1993) adds that negative peace is not a solution to existing problems on earth, as they are composed of a variety of cultures, races, nations, religions and economic difficulties. On the other hand, positive peace means the ability

to live together by valuing and accepting all races and cultures.

Galtung (1985) and Brock-Utne (1985) presented a different outlook that relates to indirect violence versus direct violence. From this viewpoint, positive peace is defined as the lack of indirect violence (injustice, inequality, etc.) among individuals or organized groups. Negative peace is defined as a lack of direct organized or unorganized violence (generally war). In addition to the definitions of peace as presented until now, it is possible to address two further components of the concept, attitudes toward it, and willingness to give up something for it. Attitudes towards peace can be more or less positive, optimistic or pessimistic. This is also true of willingness to give up things and compromise. There are those who are wiling to give up more, and there are those who are not willing to give up anything or to comprise at all. In the study conducted by Ichilov and Masaway (1994) regarding adolescents' perceptions of peace, it was found that Israeli Jews show a more positive attitude towards peace than Israeli Arabs, and also tend to agree to more compromise and sacrifice for peace than Israeli Arabs.

Factors Affecting the Perception of the Peace Concept

Studies concerning the perception of peace in the past focused mainly on developmental changes occurring in understanding the concept during childhood and adolescence. Hakvoort & Oppenheimer (1993) note in their study that they expected understanding of peace to develop with age from a personal level (egocentric) to a general level (collectivist). But research findings indicate that adolescents also consider peace on a personal level. The study found that the general level develops with age,

but does not replace the personal level, it combines with it. Furthermore, they hypothesized the perception of the concept of peace would be more abstract as the age of the respondents rose, i.e., there would be a transition from the concrete (acceptance, patience) to the abstract (universal rights). This hypothesis was not supported in their research as they found that abstract joins concrete and does not replace it. They also found that from age eight, most children understand peace as a lack of war and a lack of fighting (warlike acts) on a collective level. Children who did not show this pattern (generally under age eight) either did not understand the concept of peace or could not express it in words. However, it was noted that from the moment the child begins to understand the concept of peace, it is generally understood as a lack of war.

In recent years, focus has begun on cultural and situational influences over the perception of peace, war and conflict (Raviv et al., 1998). Based on research and theory in the field, it is possible to discern three groups of factors affecting individuals' perceptions of peace:

1. Historical narrative and social beliefs created within the historical framework.

2. The unique situation in which the individual lives.

3. Specific educational experiences of the individual within society.

These factors affect the creation of social knowledge. This knowledge is created and acquired by members of a given society as a result of its history, conditions and special experiences. This knowledge may be maintained over many generations and does not easily change (Raviv et al., 1998). It provides society with a common basis for interaction and communication, as members of a given society who grow up in a given

culture maintain many common beliefs. Furthermore, it allows mutual dependency and creates a common social identity. Therefore, the individual's opinions are affected, among other things, by the opinions of the social and cultural environment in which he lives.

Collective narrative is actually the story of the history of a society as society views the story to be. It is a detailed story designed by ideologists or politicians, philosophers and educators to create some form of logic in the story of the past, to draw conclusions regarding the future (Sirkka, 1999). This narrative includes events unique to a specific society, such as war, conflict and peace which are strong central experiences with decisive effects over society. However, every society presents these concepts differently according to its own specific experiences and conditions. (Cooper, 1998, 1999). In addition to the fact that the narrative encompasses a broad range of concepts that relate to special events, it includes an integrated group of social beliefs related to the collective, to enemies, to goals, etc. As the present research examines the perceptions of Israeli Druze youth regarding peace, we will focus on Druze beliefs related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Societies in a state of conflict develop special social beliefs in order to create vital psychological conditions for better coping with the conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). These psychological conditions include dedication to society and the land, high motivation to contribute, perseverance under physical and psychological pressure, willingness to sacrifice, unity, solidarity, maintaining society's aims, dedication bravery and the ability to suffer. Social beliefs are acquired through social institutions (educational systems).

De-legitimization of others: Jews see Arab society as inhuman. Arabs are perceived as murderers, terrorists, unreliable, primitive, and as lacking value for human life (Bar-Tal, 1994, 1995; Bar, Gal & Bar, 1996). In the same way, Arabs perceive Jews as cruel murderers, haters (Harkavi, 1967), infidels, traitors, sly, aggressive, avaricious, racist (Harkavi, 1971; Sharon, 1997), controlling and acting unjustly (Bar, Gal & Bar, 1996).

Positive self image: Every society sees itself as primary and just. The Jews of Israel perceive their actions as positive and explain their negative actions as a necessity of reality. They consider them to be less negative than the acts of Arabs (Bar Tal, 1994, 1995). Arabs note that in the past they acted fairly towards the Jews, and their later aggression began as a result of the Jews occupation of the land. Violent acts are only a response to Israeli conquest and terror (Harkavi, 1967, 1971).

Image of the victim: Jews who have experienced difficult experiences throughout years in the Diaspora, have developed a belief common to Jewish society in Israel, which is "everyone is against us" (Bar Tal, 1994, 1995). On the other hand, Arabs see themselves as the victims of Israeli conquest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Firer and Aduan, 1997; Bar-Tal & Rouhana, 1998).

Peace as a desire for the future, setting peace as an aim providing optimism: Jews have set peace as a social goal. On the other hand, among the Arabs at first the perception was of destroying Israel with no possibility for finding a peaceful solution (because that would mean recognizing the State of Israel). Over the years there has been a shift in Palestinian attitudes, apparently because of their recognition that destroying Israel is not possible. Today, their outlook is "land for peace",

i.e., willingness to achieve peace if Israel will withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 (Giladi, 1997).

The educational system as a tool for transmitting social narrative and beliefs: The educational system is a central socialization agent through which social beliefs, attitudes and values (cultural and interpersonal) are transmitted (Bar-Tal & Zoltek, 1989). This is conducted mainly through school which is the central socialization agent (Pasternak & Zidkiyahu, 194), which in democratic regimes, is also considered to be an institute through which national narratives and political orientations of society are transmitted (Bar-Tal & Zoltek, 1989). One way that school does this is through formal education: curricula and textbooks. Furthermore, school contributes to forming individual behavior in interpersonal relations and relations between social groups , ethnic groups and national groups (Levin, 1994). Proof of the fact that the educational system is a pipeline for transmission and cultivation of beliefs, attitudes and values is that when reality changes or there is a need to prepare for a new reality, there is an immediate need to change curricula and study materials (Firer & Aduan, 1997; Pasternak & Zidkiyahu, 1994).

Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process occurring presently, the educational system in Israel is reorganizing both regarding values and beliefs that it had previously taught, and regarding study material that assisted this process. Until recently, education towards values included spiritual guidelines for Israeli society, such as values related to physical power, force, military supremacy, commitment to the state. Emphasis was placed on belief in "purity of the weapon" , "it is good to die for our country", "the world is against us", etc. (Degani,

1994). Slowly, over the years, a number of these values have been undermined as a result of a changing reality. Now there is a perceptual change occurring. For example, the existence of the state is possible not only through force but also through peaceful methods. This is a different more open, accepting way of thought where yesterday's enemy is today's partner (Degani, 1994). Furthermore, the Palestinians are also reassessing their educational system. Until now they tended to teach in their schools based on Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks. Now they use their own books that present their own unique state, suited to the new reality that has been created.

The impact of collective narrative over perception of the concept of peace: Ecworth et al. (1998) based their studies on the assumption that adolescents' perceptions of peace develop within the social and historical context, i.e. adolescents do not grow up in a historical, cultural and social vacuum. In their study they chose to compare adolescents in Holland and Sweden, two countries that are similar regarding their social development. Both countries belong to Northwest Europe. Both have a democratic regime, and both contain similar social and economic standards regarding education, health system social welfare, etc.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in both countries adolescents are educated towards a similar future. There are similar areas of employment, and in both adolescents are fed from information coming from a wealth of media. Despite this fact, a difference was found between adolescents of these two countries in perception of the concept of peace, a difference that is apparently connected to the nature of their involvement in World War Two. While Holland was directly involved in the war and

experienced the German invasion, Sweden was only indirectly involved by equipping the German army and providing information to both sides (i.e., neutral). The research findings indicated a difference in adolescents' perception of the concept of peace. The Dutch adolescents perceived peace as negative peace (a lack of war or war activities), more frequently than the Swedish adolescents. The Swedish adolescents tended to relate more to positive peace. This tendency was attributed to the two countries' different levels of participation in World War Two.

Based on these findings, I expect to find a difference in perceiving peace between Israeli Druze adolescents in Druze villages (not mixed) and Druze adolescents living in mixed villages (with Moslems and Christians), because of the different specific situations that they are in. Situation is related to situational factors and impact the concept of peace differently.

Orientations of Narrative - Individualism and Collectivism: Narrative includes not only content but also orientation. Two particularly relevant orientations are individual and collective. These orientations are related to analysis of the self as dependent or independent of others surrounding him.

The self category is first and foremost a product of socialization agents, such that differences in analysis of the self as independent of others will occur in a culture typified by individualism. On the other hand, Japanese culture tends to see the self as being mutually dependent with those surrounding it and an inseparable part of others, and therefore this type of culture is a collective culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). An individual living in an individualistically oriented culture tends to see himself as

separate from others. The norm in this type of culture is to highlight each individual's uniqueness. Furthermore, individual behavior stems from how one addresses his internal world, his thoughts, his emotions and actions and not those of others. In this type of culture, others serve mainly for comparison. On the other hand, in a culture having a collectivist orientation, the norm is strengthening mutual dependency between individuals. This type of culture considers the individual to be an inseparable part of a system of social relations, and his behavior is highly dependent and organized through addressing the thoughts, emotions and acts of others who are connected to him through relationships.

The orientation of Israeli society compared to that of Palestinian society: One of the overall changes in Israeli society has been "globalization". I the 1980s this change accelerated. The significance of this change was that Israelis became more aware of and involved in what was occurring in the world much more than in the past. Globalization has increased western influences over Israel and made it, among other things, more individualistic and less ideological and cohesive (Samooha, 1999). This is expressed, among other things, in economic privatization in which the government is shaking off ownership of assets and in a certain sense its responsibility. A state has been created in which each individual takes care of himself. On the other hand, the Palestinians have gone through the opposite process. Palestinians lived as individualists in the past. One of the harsh arguments that Arabs made against themselves after the Six Day War was that Arabs were individualists to an extreme, and individualism meant preferring private interests over the good of the group. An Arab, although he cooperates within his family and friendly

environment, it is difficult for him to deviate from this framework and cooperate with everyone in his village, city or homeland (Jubarn Shamia, in Harkavi, 1972). Today, they have a more nationalistic orientation and act for a general goal - achieving a state and a national identity as a minority is the focus of their group experience (Sliman, 1999).

The social identity theory may explain the collective nature of the Palestinians versus the Jews, because in particular, it addresses situations that contain asymmetrical relations between groups, such as majority minority relations (Hog & Abrams, 1988). According to this theory, members of the minority group will use a variety of strategies to avoid a feeling of low self worth. One strategy is motivating the group as a collective. Furthermore, in order to achieve their goal, the minority group members will participate in a collective struggle. Therefore, Palestinians, who are the minority in an asymmetrical relationship with the Jews (Bar, Gal & Bar, 1996; Sliman, 1999; Maoz, 2000), will have a more collectivist orientation. In the study by Oyserman (1993) which supports the argument that individualist or collectivist orientation is the product of culture and social situation, it was found that Arabs have a more collectivist orientation than Jews.

The impact of situational factors over perceptions of the concept of peace: Situational factors have a strong impact over how members of a certain society understand concepts related to these situations. Situations such as hunger, recession or mass catastrophes can create an immediate impact over the manner in which members of a given society perceive their social world. These influences can be so strong that they leave their mark for a long time and become added to social knowledge (Raviv et al., 1998).

Therefore a state of war affects the way members of a given society in this state perceive the concepts of peace and war. This is true of a state of violent conflict also.

Spielmann (1986) indicated in her research that powerful situations that awaken hope for peace may also have an impact over the perception of war, peace and conflict. The results of her research showed clearly that special situations that are particularly powerful such as the historic visit of the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, has an impact on how children and adolescents perceive peace. She performed a comparison of how children and adolescents perceived peace before and after the visit. All age groups indicated a change in perceiving the concept of peace after the visit. The younger children changed their positions from optimism to pessimism, while the older participants changed their attitudes from pessimistic to optimistic.

The impact of specific educational experiences over perceiving the concept of peace: Specific educational experiences that may affect perceptions of peace can be curricula on peace, such as workshops on the subject, meetings between groups in conflict, specific school activities or programs that educate regarding a situation in which there is no peace, such as army training activities or summer camps in occupied territories, in which youths are taught how to use various weapons.

The present research will examine the impact of a Civics curriculum that includes curricula within the regular school framework and a meeting between Jewish Israeli youth and Druze youth.

Druze in the Israeli Defense Force

As previously mentioned, in 1957, the Israeli government recognized the Druze sect as an independent religions group and allowed its believers to live according to their customs and traditions. Since the founding of the State, the Druze have been serving in the IDF and took part in conquering the Galilee, the Sinai operation, the Six Day war, the Yom Kippur War, the War Peace of the Galilee and the Second Lebanon War, and all other security actions following.

The Druze unit of the IDF is part of the minority unit. It was organized during the War of Independence by Druze dignitaries who called for all young Druze who were bodily able to volunteer to serve in the IDF and to take an active part in establishing Israel and maintaining the security of its borders and lives of its citizens (Halbi, 1970).

In 1955, when Arab infiltration to Israel increased, the Druze leaders reached the conclusion that Druze youths should be obligated to be recruited to the IDF. They turned to David Ben Gurion, the Ministry of Defense and asked him to legislate a law of compulsory recruitment among the Druze. Ben Gurion who knew that the Druze were absolutely loyal to the state, responded to their request willingly, and the Israeli government decided to apply obligatory military service to the Druse. Since then, every able bodied male youth is recruited to military service at age 18. The Druze unit soldiers have participated in many battles and participate in all security actions and guarding of the country's borders.

The Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan said at the gravesite of a Druze sergeant who fell chasing terrorists in the South: "These Druze soldiers protect our lives, and sometimes they are the best and the most

daring, they take greater risks than others, break in and attack. Their blood spills all over our land". He added: "The Druze sect is not great in numbers, but great in strength. Its villages and towns sit safely on the Carmel and in the Galilee and the best of their youth are on the front, spread along the borders, endangering their lives for all residents of Israel. In the mountain paths, in the desert and the South, the brave Druze move with their weapons in hand and beat those who try to infiltrate our land and kill us".

Lieutenant General David Elazar said at one of the celebrations of the Druze unit: "Eighteen years the Druze unit has existed. Eighteen years the State of Israel has existed. They are the clear signs of cooperation between the Druze and the Jewish nation. Therefore we are partners in all, in rights and obligations as one". He added: "The Druze unit is a fighting unit not a representative unit. It plays its part in continually ensuring the security of the state and the peace of the nation. The covenant between the Druze nation and the Jewish nation is not only on paper, but it is made holy by the blood of Druze fighters".

Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin said at the ceremony for a Druze memorial: "All those years and all those painful days the Druze sect was a partner to the beautiful hours and also the pain of loss. From the first day of the state until this day, the Druze sect has been an inseparable part of the security forces. The Druze, who tied their fate to that of Israel, have proved themselves. They have been anywhere they were called, fought, did their duty and beyond, their blood has touched ours. The Jewish and Druze shared fate has led to achievements and created security. On this evening I salute the parents, the widows, the orphans and all members of this wonderful sect" (Nasaraldin, Halbi, 1993).

In conclusion, in the present dissertation I will address the attitudes of Druze youth regarding military service, and what the impact of identity and feelings of belonging to the State are.

Attitudes

The concept of attitude has played an important role throughout the development of social psychology for many years. Allport (1954) described the concept of attitude as "the central cornerstone in the building of social psychology". Allport (1935) also defined the concept of attitude, and his definition is accepted by most social psychologists to this day, although additional various definitions have been offered. The following is Allport's definition: A person's attitude towards some object constitutes a predisposition on his part to respond to the object in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner.

Generally, as far as attitude is concerned, no differentiation is made between the affective and cognitive components of which it is composed, since both of these components are connected to one another and are both measured verbally. Often, questions regarding attitudes towards a certain object and beliefs related to the object are measured on the same attitude scale, and even using the same question (Wicker, 1969). A possible reason for the popularity of the concept of attitude is that social psychologists have assumed that attitudes are strongly connected, by definition, to social behavior. In the concluding chapter of his book on changing attitudes and social influence Cohen (1964) summarizes that most researchers whose work was surveyed in his book, begin with the broad psychological assumption that since attitudes are tendencies

towards moral actions, they have an influence on the way people act towards one another, on the plans they make for themselves, and the way these plans are actually implemented. This assumption considers an attitude to be a sign of behavior and a determinant of the way a person will act in his day to day life.

The concept of behavior in this context relates to overt and measurable behavior only. Furthermore, this is nonverbal behavior that is measurable outside of the situation in which the attitude was measured. Despite the fact that this operational definition aims to increase precision in measuring behavior and to allow quantifying and analyzing it, as Kendler & Kendler (1949) showed, consistency or lack of consistency are actually imprecise concepts that are applied by the observer to verbal responses and overt actions, i.e., the concept of consistency or inconsistency involves the observer's judgment and does not directly address social behavior.

The common assumption mentioned above regarding the close connection between attitudes and overt behavior towards the object of the attitude led to a series of studies on the subject at the beginning of the previous century. However, as early as 1934 the first study was published that contradicted this assumption. The study, by La Pierre, was conducted in the 1930s when much testimony had accumulated as a result of studies on social distance, regarding anti-Chinese attitudes in the United States.

La Pierre (1934) crossed the United States with a Chinese couple, and without their knowledge, recorded how they were treated in hotels and restaurants that they visited. Only once throughout the entire journey did

the Chinese couple encounter refusal to be served. La Pierre found that generally service was above average. Later, he wrote to 250 hotels and restaurants on his list and asked if they would be willing to host a Chinese couple, and they all refused, although actually they all had hosted the Chinese couple previously when La Pierre was with them.

Most studies in this field, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, created a general index for attitude towards the stimulus object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974), such as Negroes, for example. They studied the relations between a grade that a person received on the attitude scale they created and between specific behavior towards the object, measured before or after measuring the attitude.

Research on Attitudes of Youths Regarding the Army and Security

Two comprehensive studies were conducted by Levy and Gutman (1974, 1976). These studies included questions on the following subjects: The value of do and don't in Israeli society and in school, continuity of the Jewish nation in Israel and the Diaspora, relations with Arabs and Arab countries, social cohesion, values and perceiving the state regarding personal welfare, and factors affecting youths worldview.

An ongoing study on this topic of youths' attitudes towards the military and preferences regarding military service was conducted by the Department of Behavioral Sciences of the IDF among youths invited to the recruitment center in the years 1974, 1975, 1980 and 1984. This study included a large number of youths from broad cross sections of the population (all youths who were candidates for military service), and has been going on for a number of years . The results of these surveys are

generally confidential. These surveys include mainly questions directly related to personal military service and less to additional variables, such as: values, preparation for the IDF in school, etc.

An additional study conducted on similar subjects was done by Bar-Lev (1988) among religious students between the years 1983-1985. The study dealt mainly with desires regarding military service and attitudes regarding military service.

A more limited study dealing with the issue of political and social Attitudes of youths was commissioned by the Van Lear Institute in Jerusalem and conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute (1987). This is an ongoing study (similar to studies conducted in 1984 and 1986), concerning an examination of youths' attitudes on the following subjects: human relations in school and attitudes regarding different social groups.

Another limited study was conducted by Orr, Liron & Meyer (1986) and examined attitudes of youths in 12th grade in different study tracks regarding recruitment and service, before and after an intervention program.

A summary of findings in this field was conducted by Zamir (1986), and included findings in the field of attitudes of youths, particularly those living on the kibbutz, regarding military service. It offered a theoretical framework for understanding changes in attitudes over the years.

A comprehensive study was conducted by Gal et al. (1989) at the Israeli Military/Research Institute. The study included 5400 male and female students in grades 10 through 12 in 85 Jewish schools throughout Israel. The schools that were sampled belonged to all sectors (comprehensive theoretical, occupational, agricultural, religious, secular, urban, rural,

kibbutz). Aside from ultra-Orthodox schools and schools for Israeli minorities. This study included questions on various topics: personal attitudes regarding being recruited into the IDF, attitudes regarding topics of military and security, sources of influence in these areas, and general values.

The present dissertation will address the attitudes of Druze youth regarding the following: volunteering as a value, volunteering for the IDF, and the degree of impact of Druze values (beliefs) over this value.

The Research Hypotheses

The Background and Rationale Behind the Hypotheses

The question of identity in the State of Israel is one of the most complex questions in the current era (Shafir, 2002). Israel has existed for sixty years in the Middle East, whereas for more than a thousand years it was under the rule of the Ottomans, who took the place of the Byzantine Empire. The leaders of the Ottoman Empire were Turkish, not Arabs, but from a religions standpoint, they were Moslem. The establishment of a Jewish State within a territory controlled by a Moslem empire, perceived by the Arab world as being an Arab entity, created a deep state of problematics regarding the issue of rights and obligations towards the new State, the status of Arab residents living in the state from before the time of Statehood, and also raised the issue of ownership of area. Within this complex system lies the Druze sect.

Historically, the Druze developed relations with the Jewish nation before the creation of the State and were partners in creating the Jewish State (Atasha, 1995). On the other hand, the Druze, by their own perceptions, feel that they have been more complexly aligned with the Arab group throughout history. On one hand, the Druze belong socially and linguistically to the Arab grouping, but are not Moslems. On the other hand, they separated from Islam in the 11th century. As seen in the existing Druze literature, Islam has not tolerated religions deviating from its doctrines (Falah, 2000).

Furthermore, Islam considers the Druze to belong to it, because in the past they believed in the principles of Islam, and generally operated based on the concept of "Hatkiya", throughout their past, along with Islam,

living under the patronage of Moslems, and therefore Islam does not accept it as being a separate sect. An example of this is the lifestyle of the Druze in Jordan and Syria. The Druze of Jordan live under the patronage of the Moslems. They are not given a separate position, and their religious voice is overcome in any attempt to prove that they are in fact separate or different. They are overpowered by the Arab Moslem voice. On the other hand, the Druze in Syria do not highlight the religious element in perceiving themselves, and emphasize their loyalty to the State and its ruler. This tension with the Arab group continues to stand out in the lives of Druze in Israel, but has become stronger based on the political situation in which Israel finds itself facing the Arabs, and in light of the fact that the members of the Druze sect serve in the military.

Today, the lifestyle of the Druze in Israel and worldwide, hints at two main axes in their perceptions of themselves and their position in both the specific and the public arena. On one hand, the Druze in Israel feel like Israelis in every way. They feel belonging to the State of Israel and perceive Israel as their homeland. They are involved in all areas of life, are connected with a modern lifestyle, and adopt this into their personal lives, drawing on the principles of democracy in the Israeli regime by expressing their opinions, standing out as a separate group, demanding their rights from the State as equal citizens, etc. On the other hand, linguistically, and culturally, they belong to the Arab world.

The Social Contact Hypothesis

This is a theoretical approach which assumes that contact between people leads to change in beliefs and emotions of an individual towards others.

Social psychologists since the 1930s have felt that social contract has led to changes in prejudice, and to closeness between various groups (Baker, 1934; Tajfel, 1978; Allport, 1954; Watson, 1947).

The term "prejudice", means an attitude attributing to another patterns of behavior or attributes based on what group he belongs to, ignoring personal skills, and only using an erroneous form of generalization expressing a negative attitude towards an entire social group or members of the social group (Allport, 1954).

St. John (1975) posits that a prejudice contains three components expressed in ethnic contact:

1. The cognitive component - including beliefs regarding ethnic differences or an ideology regarding the nature of relations between ethnic groups.
2. The emotional component - expressing positive or negative emotions towards an ethnic group or contact between groups.
3. The behavioral component - expressed in willingness to act in certain ways towards a certain group or toward individuals who are members in the group.

Theoretical explanations are offered regarding the psychological processes leading to changes in interpersonal relations at the time of a meeting.

A meeting is presented as a renewing educational situation (Rose, 1947) assuming that during the encounter, opportunities are created for mutual familiarity between majority group members and minority group members. This familiarity provides participants with information that contradicts their prejudice and disproves it through relearning which leads

to acquisition of more realistic and positive beliefs. Therefore the research hypothesis will be formulated as follows:

First hypothesis - There is a difference between the perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, based on differences in degree of Druze students' exposure to the Arab population.

Second Hypothesis - Attitudes of Druze students learning in Druze schools will be more positive than students learning in mixed schools regarding identification with the State and motivation to volunteer and contribute to the State.

The Impact of Druse Tradition and Faith Hypothesis

The introduction mentions the principles of Druze belief, reincarnation, fate, etc., which are common both within the sect and outside of it. These are among the factors that encourage Druze youths to volunteer and contribute despite risk to their lives, stemming from their belief in fate and reincarnation, two central values of Druze belief.

Third Hypothesis - This hypothesis examines if there is a correlation between living based on the principles of Druze faith and between volunteering and contributing to the State, even at risk to one's life.

The Research

1. The Research Design

The research was conducted among 100 youths, all students in 12th grade, in two comprehensive Druze schools in a Druze village and a mixed Druze village in the north of Israel.

This may not be considered a representative sample of Druze youths of this age group throughout the country as these two schools were not chosen randomly but rather for random reasons. These two schools are defined as Druze schools, because in one school all of the students are Druze and in the other, most of the students are Druze.

The distribution of the students is as follows:

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents by Type of School

Type of School	Total Respondents	Percentage
Druze	50	50%
Mixed	50	50%

The research population was composed of boys and girls as follows:

Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Gender	Total Respondents	Percentage
Boys	50	50%
Girls	50	50%

The research population was composed of religious and secular youths as follows:

Table 3: Distribution of Respondents by Religiosity

Religiosity	Total Respondents	Percentage
Secular	80	80%
Religious	20	20%

Furthermore, parents' level of education was examined. In our analysis only the distribution of fathers' education was used.

Table 4: Distribution of Respondents by Father's Education

Father's Education	Total Respondents	Percentage
Up to 8 years	29	29%
9-12 years	25	25%
13+ years	46	46%

The research data were gathered on questionnaires distributed in the classes at the end of the 2007 school year. The questionnaires were structured questionnaires with closed ended questions.

The first section of the research is an analysis of the questionnaire by presenting averages. The second part of the research is an examination of correlations between the variables.

2. The Research Method

The research was conducted among 100 youths, all Druze students in 12th grade in two Druze high schools in Israel: 50 Druze girls and 50 Druze boys.

The following is the distribution of students according to the two schools:

Table 5: Distribution of Students by Village

School	School Type	Respondents	Percentages
Beit Jan	Druze	50	50%
Majar	Mixed	50	50%

The respondents were divided by areas of residence:

Upper Galilee- Beit Jan, a solely Druze village

Lower Galilee: Majar - a mixed village of Druze, Moslems and Christians.

Table 6: Distribution of Students by Gender and Village

Area of Residence	Boys	Girls
Beit Jan	25	25
Majar	25	25
Total	50	50

3. The Questionnaire Topics

The questionnaire included three main areas of content, in addition to background data.

a) Attitudes regarding the Israeli Arab conflict and the peace process:

- The chances for peace and war.
- The desire for peace among the participants in the conflict.

- Willingness for compromise and perceiving the peace process.
- Terror and the peace process.
- Results of the peace process.
- Sources of influence over attitudes regarding the conflict and the peace process.

b) Values, national identity and perception of democracy:

- Personal values.
- National identity and connection to Israel.
- Attitudes regarding democratic values.

c) Attitudes regarding being recruited and serving in the army or in national service.

The Research Findings

Presentation of the Data

1) The research results are divided into three areas of content:

1. Attitudes towards the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.
2. Attitudes towards military service and contribution to the State.
3. Democratic and Druze values and Druze identity.

2) In each area of content, for each question that is presented, the data were analyzed in general for all respondents, and then according to groups. Examination of differences between sub-groups was conducted using T tests and variance analysis. Examinations of correlations between the motivation variables and identity variables were conducted using correlations.

1. Relative frequencies and averages of various items comprising the topic of the area. These findings will be presented by school, and in relevant cases, will be presented according to gender also.
2. Some of the issues included a number of indices (index - average of a number of items measuring the same world of content). For each index the following were calculated: Averages by type of school; average by socio-demographic variables; and correlations with content variables within the research, correlations between various indices in the same area of content.
3. Summary of each issue and each area as a whole.
4. The results are presented in two parts

The first part describes the data which are of interest within the framework of the present research.

The second part presents the findings related to the hypotheses.

The following table presents the main attitude scales, with additional details regarding the questions which comprise the indices delineated further on in the dissertation.

The Research Indices by World of Content

Area	Attitude	Item number
The Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace Process	1. Willingness for concessions	5
	2. Druze desire for peace	2
	3. Positive results of the peace agreement	6
	4. Positive results for Arabs	6
	5. Terror as part of life and fear of it.	2
	6. Sources of impact over attitudes in the field of:	
	- Teachers and school	2
	- Atmosphere and media.	2
	- Significant figures	4
General Values and Perception of Democracy	1. Materialism and Liberalism	9
	2. Contributing to the group	4
	3. Religiosity and family	3
	4. Academic achievement	2
	5. Progress and mobility	6
	6. Identity and connection to the country	3
	7. Freedom to critique and strike	2
Military Service	1. Motivation for significant service.	
Druze Values and Identity	1. National identity	5
	2. Druze Values	3

Data Analysis Methods

The items for each area were analyzed for relative frequency, average and standard deviation. Examinations of differences between sub-populations (Druze students in Druze schools and Druze students in mixed schools) were conducted using T tests. Correlations between variables were examined using coefficients.

The First Hypothesis

The first research hypothesis is that there is a difference between the perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the peace process.

Attitudes Towards the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace Process

Chance for Peace and War

Belief regarding the ability of achieving peace is an important factor behind finding a resolution to the Israeli-Arab conflict.

The following table presents data by gender to the question: Can peace be achieved? (This question had four possible answers from "Absolutely yes", to "Absolutely not")

Table 7: Belief that Peace may be Achieved

(Percent answering "yes" or "absolutely yes")

	Boys	Girls
Peace can be achieved	74%	68%

The table indicates that between 2/3 and 3/4 of the participants in the study believe that peace can be achieved.

We now examine attitudes according to type of school. The question had four possible answers. Higher numbers express a stronger belief that peace can be achieved.

Table 8: Can Peace by Achieved (by Type of School)

Druze School	2.35
Mixed School	2.90

The table indicates the following findings:

1. Each of the schools report that peace can be achieved.
2. However, the mixed school has a strong belief that peace can be achieved.
3. In order to illustrate the difference, we may present the data in percentages, i.e., in the mixed school 78% believe that peace can be achieved, versus the Druze school where only 65% hold this belief.

In addition, the students were asked if they feel that there will be another war between Israel and Arab countries in the coming years.

The following table presents the distribution of those responding "There will not be another war" or "There may be another war within 10 years".

Table 9: No War is Expected By School Type

	Druze	Mixed
No war expected	27%	46%

The table indicates that a quarter of the Druze students in Druze schools perceive a low probability of an additional war. On the other hand, half

of the Druze students learning in a mixed school feel that no war is expected in the near future.

The students in the Druze school are more skeptical regarding the present peace process as ending future wars, relative to the students in the mixed school.

We examined belief in peace using an indirect question: "Do you agree that in order to exist as a State, Israel has no choice but to maintain a strong army and to fight for its existence?". A positive response to this question is related to the belief that peace can be achieved. 80% of the Druze students learning in the Druze school reported strongly agreeing or agreeing that Israel must maintain a strong army today. On the other hand, 69% of the Druze students in the mixed school agreed with this statement.

Summary of the Topic of the Chance for Peace and War

Approximately 2/3 of the Druze students learning in a Druze school believe that peace can be achieved, and 1/4 assess that there is a low probability for a war in the future.

In the mixed school, the Druze students report a higher belief that peace can be achieved. 3/4 of the students believe that peace can be achieved and 1/2 assess a low probability for war in the future.

The belief that peace can be achieved is related to the perception that a peace agreement will lead to positive results. Most of the Druze students studying in either Druze and/or mixed schools believe that in order to maintain a state, a strong army is necessary.

The Desire for Peace

In order to achieve peace, it is very important to want to achieve it. Furthermore, it is also important to examine how each side perceives the desire for peace of the other side.

The following table presents the data from the responses to the question: To what degree do you think most Jews in Israel/ Druze in Israel/ Arabs in Israel, are interested in peace?

No significant differences were found in responses by gender, and therefore only differences between type of school will be presented.

(There were four possible responses to the question: Very much, to a degree, little, not at all).

Table 10: The Desire for Peace, by Type of School

(Percent answering "very much")

Question	Druze	Mixed
Most Jews in Israel are interested in peace	77%	65%
Most Druze in Israel are interested in peace	71%	76%
Most Arabs in Israel are interested in peace	79%	83%
Palestinians and Arab States are interested in peace	59%	77%

The table indicates the following findings:

1. Druze students studying in the Druze school perceive the Israeli Arabs and Jews as most interested in peace, and the Palestinians and Arab States as less interested in peace.
2. The Druze students in the mixed school perceive Israeli Arabs and Palestinians and Arab States as more interested in peace, and the Jews as less interested in peace.

Illustration 1: Rights to Territories According to Type of School (Percent)

The IDF's Deterrent Ability

The deterrent ability of the IDF is seemingly important as a catalyst for the desire for peace on the other side. The following table presents the percentage of those who responded that the IDF's deterrent ability is high or very high, and also provides the average for the question (high numbers indicate high deterrent ability). The results are first presented according to gender.

Table 11: IDF's Deterrent Ability by Gender

(Percent answering "high" or "very high")

	Boys	Girls
Percent	72%	68%
Average	3.85	3.76

The Druze students perceive the IDF as having a high deterrent ability. The boys feel that this is stronger than the girls do.

The Peace Process - Willingness for Concessions and Perception of the Process

An important component of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the perception of who has more right to territories in Israel.

The following table presents the findings regarding the question: Who has more rights over Judea and Samaria? The responses are provided according to school (there were three possible responses, and a low number indicates that Jews have more right, a high number indicates that Arabs have more right, and the middle number indicates that both have equal rights).

Table 12: Who has More Right to Territories, by Type of School

	Druze	Mixed
Jews have more right	31%	19%
Jews and Arabs have equal rights	28%	25%
Arabs have more right	41%	56%

The table indicates the following conclusions:

The Druze students attribute more rights to Judea and Samaria to Arabs than to Jews. The territories are one major issue of the conflict. We examined if, according to the respondents, Israel must return or not return the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria within the framework of or in return for a peace agreement.

The following are the findings. In general, no differences were found

between boys and girls, and therefore the findings are only presented based on type of school.

Table 13: Willingness to Concede Land

	Golan Heights			Judea and Samaria		
	All	Some	None	All	Some	None
Druze School	51%	29%	20%	59%	31%	10%
Mixed School	58%	24%	18%	70%	25%	6%

The results of the table indicate the following conclusions:

Among Druze students there is the least willingness for concessions in the Golan Heights compared to Judea and Samaria.

Now, we examine these issues by school type. First we examine the findings regarding willingness to concede land for a peace agreement (answers ranging from 1-3 with higher numbers expressing less willingness for land concessions).

Table 14: Unwillingness to Concede Territory, by Type of School

	Druze	Mixed
Return Golan Heights for peace	2.00	1.90
Return Judea and Samaria for peace	1.50	1.36

The table indicates the following findings:

- In the Druse school, the students show more "right" wing attitudes than students in the mixed Druze school.
- The Druze students in both types of school show less

willingness to concede the Golan Heights than Judea and Samaria.

We examined the correlation between willingness for concessions in the peace process and between socio-demographic background variables. The following findings arose:

1. Parental education: the higher the educational level of the mother and father, the more willingness there was for concessions (correlation of -0.18)
2. Economic status: a lower economic situation was correlated with a higher level of lack of willingness for concessions (correlation of 0.15)

In summary of the topic of willingness for concessions and perception of the peace process:

- The Druze students perceive that Arabs have more right to Judea and Samaria than the Jews.
- A relatively high rate of Druze students feels that Israel should return all of the territories (Golan heights 54%, Judea and Samaria 65%).
- There is no great difference between the perceptions of Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school.
- The Druze students in the Druze school show more right wing attitudes than the Druze students in a mixed school.

Results of the Peace Process

This section examines how the students perceive the chances for various results of the peace process. The results of the process and the chances for their realization are very important as they are related to belief in the possibility for peace and the desire to achieve peace.

The following table presents the chances for results of the peace process. The scale included five categories, with high numbers expressing high chances. The results are presented as averages and arranged in descending order for all of the Druze students. (The results are rated in parentheses from highest -1 to lowest -12).

Table 15: Results of the Peace Process

	Average	Rating
Economic growth	3.66	(1)
Sense of personal security	3.13	(2)
End of the wars	3.27	(3)
Cooperation between nations	3.21	(4)
Creation of a Palestinian State	2.41	(5)
Increased terror against Israel	2.92	(6)
Removal of Jewish settlements in the territories	2.85	(7)
Friendship between Jews and Palestinians	2.67	(8)
Conceding land for no peace	2.59	(9)
Realizing the right of return	2.39	(10)
Autonomy of Israeli Arabs	2.35	(11)
Conceding sovereignty over East Jerusalem	2.00	(12)

The table indicates the following findings:

Among the Druze students, the results perceived as most likely (first 4)

are those which are of interest to all sides involved in the peace process, Jews and Arabs (economic growth, personal security, cooperation, end of wars). On the other hand, the Druze students evaluate that there is a low chance for conceding sovereignty over Jerusalem and realizing the right of return, which are points of contention between the Jews and Arabs in their negotiations.

Perception of this situation is quite pessimistic regarding the peace process, and may decrease the belief that peace can be achieved. Among the Druze students, the worrisome issues are that the aims of the peace process are perceived as unlikely to occur. We now move on to examine the data based on type of school, relating to the results which are controversial.

Table 16: Results of the Peace Process - by Type of School

Item	Druze	Mixed
Removal of settlements	3.58	3.73
Autonomy for Israeli Arabs	3.45	3.81
Palestinian State	3.25	3.48
Conceding land for no peace	3.24	3.75
Right of return	2.66	3.16
Conceding sovereignty of East Jerusalem	2.24	2.37

The following findings arise from the table:

The results that Arabs have an interest in are perceived by the Druze students in a mixed school to have a greater chance to be realized.

In summary of the issue of the results of the peace process:

Among the Druze students, the positive results which are common to all sides of the conflict were perceived to have a high probability for realization as a result of the peace process. The results that are Worrisome and under dispute are perceived to have a lower chance for realization based on the peace process. In general, compared to the students in the Druze school, the students in the mixed school perceive a better probability of realizing results which are of an interest to Arabs.

Factors Affecting the Attitudes of the Druze Students

The factors affecting the attitudes of the Druze students regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process were examined. The students were asked to mark, for various factors, to what degree each one of them affects their attitudes on the subject. The following is a list of factors, in descending order, from the highest (most influential) factor to the lowest (least influential) factor.

Table 17: Factors Affecting Attitudes on the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace Process

Item	Average	Rating
Atmosphere in Israel	3.95	1
The media	3.93	2
Parents	2.96	3
Friends/Peers	2.72	4
Teachers at school	2.60	5
Religious figures	2.58	6
General school activities	2.50	7
Youth movement counselors	2.45	8

The table indicates that "the atmosphere in Israel" and "the media" are perceived as having a high degree of impact over students' attitudes regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict . These are the main source of up to date information on the issue of the peace process. The media and the general atmosphere in Israel are generally an expression of the general social norms in Israel.

The significant role of general non-specific environmental systems, such as atmosphere and media, is clearly evident in its impact over the attitudes of students regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.

On the other hand, the impact of more formal factors, such as teachers and youth movement counselors are perceived as lower regarding these subjects. At the same time, it is clear that friends and peer group apparently serve as role models and a source of identification and as a main source of up to date information on the subject.

It is interesting that 21% of the students feel that teachers in school do not have any impact at all over their attitudes, versus 22% who feel that teachers have a strong and very strong impact. 26% of the students feel that school has no impact on their attitudes at all, while 21% feel that school has a strong to very strong impact over them.

Examination of the First Hypothesis

The first research hypothesis is that there is a difference between the perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.

In order to examine this hypothesis, we compared between two schools, a Druze school and a mixed school, regarding the items related to the issue of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process. Distribution of the respondents was 50 respondents from the Druze school (50%) and 50 respondents from the mixed school (50%).

In order to compare the two groups, T tests were conducted to examine differences in averages of respondents from the Druze school and respondents from the mixed school in attitudes regarding the peace process and the conflict.

General Attitudes Regarding the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace Process

Questions related to peace

* To what degree do you feel most of the Jewish population in Israel is interested in peace?

1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much

Table 18: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Most of the Jewish Population is Interested in Peace"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.12	0.84	50	4	19	40	37
Mixed	2.83	0.85	50	6	29	42	23

$P<0.05$; $t=1.72$

A significant difference was found between perceptions of Druze students in the Druze school and the mixed school regarding their perception of Jews in Israel being interested in peace.

When combining "To a degree" and "Very much", it as found that the students in the Druze school responded more highly to this topic (77%) compared to the students in the mixed school (65%). Statistically, this difference is significant ($p<0.05$).

* To what degree are Arab citizens of Israel interested in peace?

1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much

Table 19: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Israeli Arabs are Interested in Peace"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.18	0.86	50	4	16	36	43
Mixed	3.27	0.83	50	3	14	35	48

$P<0.05$; $t=0.53$

When combining the categories of "to a degree" and "very much", a difference was found between the students in the Druze school (79%) and the mixed school (83%), although this difference is not statistically significant.

* To what degree do you feel most of the Druze in Israel are interested in peace?

1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much

Table 20: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Most Druze in Israel are Interested in Peace"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	2.89	0.84	50	6	23	47	24
Mixed	3.06	0.82	50	3	21	42	34

$P<0.05$; $t=1.02$

When combining the two categories of "to a degree" and "very much", a difference was found between the students in the Druze school (71%) and the mixed school (76%), although this difference is not statistically significant.

* To what degree do you feel most of the Arabs (Palestinians and neighboring countries) are interested in peace?

1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much

Table 21: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Palestinians and Arab States are Interested in Peace"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	2.97	0.83	50	3	28	29	30
Mixed	3.27	0.96	50	7	16	21	56

$P<0.05$; $t=1.67$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding to what degree Palestinians and Arab states are interested in peace. When combining the categories of "to a degree" and "very much", the students in the mixed school responded more highly (77%) than the students in the Druze school (59%). This difference is statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

Illustration 2: The Desire for Peace According to Type of School (Percents)



* Do you feel it is possible or impossible to achieve peace between Israel and the Arabs?

1. Not at all; 2: No; 3. Yes; 4. Absolutely

Table 22: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace between the Israel and the Arabs"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	2.64	0.88	50	12	28	45	15
Mixed	2.94	0.85	50	7	19	48	26

$P<0.05$; $t=1.73$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding to what degree it was possible to achieve peace between Israel and the Arabs. When connecting the two categories "Yes" and "Absolutely", it was found that students in the mixed school responded more highly to

this question (74%) compared to students in the Druze school (60%). This difference was found to be statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

* Who has more rights to Judea and Samaria, the Jews or the Arabs?

1. The Arabs have much more rights; 2. The Arabs have more rights; 3. Both have equal rights; 4. The Jews have more right; 5. the Jews have much more right.

Table 23: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Rights to the Territories of Judea and Samaria, Jews or Arabs"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	2.87	1.33	50	19	22	28	15	16
Mixed	2.43	1.18	50	24	32	27	9	8

$P<0.05$; $t=1.74$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school. When connecting two categories (4,5) indicating more rights to Jews regarding the territories, it was found that students in the Druze school responded more highly to this question (31%) compared to students in the mixed school (17%). On the other hand, when connecting the two categories (1,2) indicating more rights for Arabs to the territories, it was found that students in the mixed school responded more highly (56%), compared to students in the Druze school (41%). This difference was found to be statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

*Within the framework of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, do you feel that Israel should or should not return Judea and Samaria?

1. Israel should return all of Judea and Samaria; 2. Israel should return only part of Judea and Samaria; 3. Israel should not return any of Judea and Samaria.

Table 24: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Returning Territories in Judean And Samaria in Peace Agreement"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3
Druze	1.50	0.66	50	59	31	9
Mixed	1.36	0.59	50	70	25	6

P<0.05; t=1.21

59% of the students in the Druze school feel that within the framework of a peace agreement, Israel should return Judea and Samaria. On the other hand, 70% of the students in the mixed school feel this way. However, this difference is not statistically significant.

* Do you feel Israel should or should not agree to the creation of a Palestinian State?

1. Absolutely should agree; 2: I think they should agree; 3. I think they should not agree; 4. Absolutely should not agree.

Table 25: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Creating a Palestinian State"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	2.65	0.87	50	7	41	32	20
Mixed	2.17	0.82	50	19	51	22	7

P<0.05; t=2.83

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school. When connecting the two categories (1,2) indicating agreement to creating a

Palestinian State, the students in the mixed school responded more highly to this question (70%) than the students in the Druze school (48%). This difference was found to be statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

The Peace Process

* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to and end to wars in the next few years?

1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance; 5. Very high chance

Table 26: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will Lead to and End to Wars"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.07	1.08	50	11	15	38	28	8
Mixed	3.46	1.02	50	3	13	41	24	20

$P<0.05$; $t=1.85$

Combining the two categories (4,5) indicating a high chance for the peace process to lead to the end of wars, shows that 44% of the students in the mixed school feel that the peace process will end wars, versus 36% of the students in the Druze school. This difference was found to be statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to cooperation between the nations within a few years?

1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance; 5. Very high chance

Table 27: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will Lead to Cooperation between Nations"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.19	1.16	50	8	21	29	27	14
Mixed	3.23	1.21	50	9	18	30	24	18

$P<0.05$; $t=0.17$

Combining the two categories (4.5) indicating a high chance for the peace process to lead to cooperation between nations, shows that 42% of the students in the mixed school feel that the peace process will do so, versus 41% of the students in the Druze school. This difference was not statistically significant.

* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to a feeling of personal security within a few years?

1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance; 5. Very high chance

Table 28: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will Lead to Personal Security"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	2.92	1.2	50	15	18	39	16	12
Mixed	3.33	1.22	50	9	15	30	25	21

$P<0.05$; $t=1.69$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the attitude that the peace process will lead to a feeling of personal security. When connecting the two categories "high chance", and "very high

chance" the students in the mixed school responded more highly to the question (46%), than the students from the Druze school (28%). This was a statistically significant difference ($p<0.05$).

* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to an increase in terror within a few years?

1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance; 5. Very high chance

Table 29: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will Lead to Increased Terror"

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.13	1.24	50	13	17	31	24	15
Mixed	2.70	1.28	50	22	23	29	14	12

$P<0.05$; $t=1.70$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the attitude that the peace process will lead to an increase in terror. When connecting the two categories "high chance" and "very high chance", the students in the Druze school responded more positively to this question (39%), compared with the students in the mixed school (26%). This is a statistically significant difference ($p<0.05$).

Table 30: Comparing Averages and T Values for Druze Students' Perceptions (Druze School, Mixed School) Regarding Peace

	Type of School			
Peace	Druze	Mixed	T val.	Scale
Jews are interested in peace	3.12	2.83	1.72*	4
Israeli Arabs are interested in peace	3.18	3.27	0.53NS	4
Druze in Israel are interested in peace	2.89	3.06	1.02NS	4
Palestinians are interested in peace	2.97	3.27	1.67*	4
Peace between Israel and Arabs	2.64	2.94	1.73*	4
Right to Judea and Samaria	2.87	2.43	1.74*	5
Peace agreement and conceding land	1.50	1.36	1.21NS	3
Creating Palestinian State	2.65	2.17	2.83*	4
Peace Process				
Process will end war	3.07	3.46	1.85*	5
Process will lead to cooperation	3.19	3.23	0.17NS	5
Process will lead to personal security	2.92	3.33	1.69*	5
Process will lead to increased terror	3.13	2.70	1.70*	5

*Significant to 0.05 at least.

Summary of the First Hypothesis

We found that there is a difference between the perceptions of students studying in the Druze school compared to those of students in the mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process. Sometimes the difference is not statistically significant, as seen in Table 30.

These findings support the first research hypothesis that there is a difference between the perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.

Attitudes Regarding Military Recruitment and Service

This section addresses the following issues:

The desire to be recruited and fears about service.

Motivation to serve in a front line position and in voluntary units.

The desire to be an officer or to become a career officer.

School as encouraging service in front line units.

The Second Hypothesis

This hypothesis is based on the theory of social contact as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, which posits that contact between individuals leads to a change in attitudes of individuals towards one another. Therefore the hypothesis is as follows: Exposure of Druze students to an Arab population that does not serve in the army will affect their level of identification with the State and their motivation to volunteer and contribute to the State.

Recruitment and Serving in the Military

Desire to be recruited and fears regarding service

In the research, we asked the students how much they want or do not want to be recruited to the IDF, when the time comes. The tables below present the data (four category scale from "very much want" to "do not want at all"). The data relate to the percentage of those who responded "very much want" and "want" to be recruited to the military, and to the averages for the question (high numbers indicate more desire to serve).

Table 31: Desire to be Recruited, by Type of School

	Druze	Mixed
Very much want/want to be recruited	73%	53%
Average	3.11	2.70

Table 32: Desire to be Recruited, by Type of School

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.11	0.92	50	5	22	30	43
Mixed	2.70	1.12	50	18	28	19	34

$P<0.05$; $t=2.00$

A significant difference was found between attitudes of students in the Druze school and attitudes of students in the mixed school regarding the desire to be recruited into the IDF.

We examined the motivation to be recruited with an additional question: If IDF service was voluntary, what would you do/ The question included four possible responses: volunteering for 3 years, two years, one year or not at all.

The table below presents the data (in percents) for this question. Furthermore, the average response to the question is also presented (higher numbers express a higher desire to volunteer)

Table 33: What Would you do if Service was Voluntary, by Type of School

	Druze	Mixed
Volunteer 3 years	52%	35%
Volunteer 2 years	22%	26%
Volunteer one year	17%	23%
Not volunteer	9%	17%
Average	3.17	2.78

Table 34: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Volunteer Service

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.17	1.01	50	9	17	22	52
Mixed	2.78	1.10	50	17	23	26	35

$P<0.05$; $t=1.98$

A significant difference was found between attitudes of students in the Druze school and attitudes of students in the mixed school regarding volunteering for military service. A high rate of students learning in the Druze school report that they would perform full military service even if it was voluntary. Another aspect related to the desire to be recruited is the level of concern regarding service which is typical of people before entering the army.

The following table presents the percentage of those who report that they are "highly concerned" or "concerned" (on a five category scale).

Table 35: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Concern for Military Service

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	1.95	0.99	50	39	39	11	10
Mixed	2.10	0.91	50	25	50	16	7

$P<0.05$; $t=0.49$

No significant differences were found between the students in the Druze and mixed schools as to concerns regarding military service.

Motivation to Serve in Front Line Positions in Volunteer Units

The students were asked two questions on this issue:

1) "To what degree do you want to serve in a front line unit/position?" There were five possible responses ranging from "very much" to "very little". Higher ratings express higher motivation.

2) "If your medical profile was appropriate, would you want to volunteer to one of the volunteer units?" There were four possible responses: "absolutely" to "absolutely not", with higher numbers expressing a greater desire to volunteer.

The following table presents the percentage of those answering with the two higher categories for motivation to hold a front line position (very much and much) and a desire to be in a volunteer unit (absolutely and yes).

Table 36: Motivation to Serve on Front Line by School Type

	Druze	Mixed
Want a front line position	56%	40%
Want to serve in volunteer unit	74%	62%

The table indicates the following data:

Both among Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school there is a high level of motivation to serve in a front line unit. Only 25% were not interested in serving in a front line position or in volunteer units (based on those responding with the two most negative responses).

Table 37: Desire to Hold a Front Line Position

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.59	1.39	50	13	10	21	18	38
Mixed	3.09	1.31	50	14	21	25	22	18

P<0.05; t=1.85

Table 38: Desire to Serve in a Volunteer Unit

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.01	1.04	50	14	12	33	41
Mixed	2.63	0.88	50	14	24	49	13

P<0.05; t=1.97

Large differences were discovered between the attitudes of Druze students in the different schools regarding motivation to serve in a front line unit, in a front line position and volunteer units.

The Desire to Serve with a Profession, in the Academic Reserve

Some students are interested to combine their military service with academic studies, and work in a profession that they will learn.

The respondents were asked: "Do you intend to join the academic reserve (i.e. university studies before military service)"?

The following table presents the percentage of students responding that they are interested in the academic reserve (possible answers being yes/not interested in serving in the academic reserve).

Table 39: Desire to Serve in the Academic Reserve (Percentage)

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.23	0.93	50	8	11	31	50
Mixed	3.10	1.01	50	11	14	30	46

$P<0.05$; $t=0.68$

The table indicates the following findings:

There are no significant differences between the desire of Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the issue of the their desire to serve with a profession.

Desire to Become and Officer

One of the attributes of significant military service for a student is to be promoted in the army and to become an officer, along with his desire to connect himself to the army for a longer period of time, through a career in the military.

In the research the students were asked two question on this issue:

1) "If during your service in the IDF you had the opportunity to go to an officers' course, would you do it?" This question had five possible categories of response: "I am sure I would: to "I am sure I would not".

2) "Assume that at the end of your compulsory service you had the opportunity to become a career soldier, would you want to?" This question had four possible categories of response: "absolutely yes" to "absolutely not".

The table below presents the rate of students interested in becoming officers (combining the two highest responses, "I am sure I would" and "I think so").

Table 40: Desire to be an Officer, by School Type

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	4.20	1.05	50	2	6	15	21	55
Mixed	3.96	1.01	50	1	6	26	27	39

$P<0.05$; $t=1.16$

Approximately 3/4 of the Druze students in the Druze school expressed a desire for becoming an officer, versus 2/3 students in the mixed school. However, no significant differences were found between the desire of Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding a desire to become an officer.

We now examine their degree of desire to serve as a career soldier.

We examined this issue by type of school. The following table presents the average answers regarding the desire to be a career officer. Although the desire to become an officer was measured with five categories of response, willingness to be a career soldier was measured with four categories. A high number expresses a greater desire.

Table 41: Desire to Serve as a Career Soldier

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4
Druze	3.06	0.97	50	9	18	33	40
Mixed	2.76	1.15	50	22	15	30	33

$P<0.05$; $t=1.41$

There is no significant difference between the desires of the Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the desire to serve as a career soldier.

In summary, regarding motivation to serve in the IDF, we asked a number of questions:

1. The desire to be recruited.

2. Willingness to serve in the IDF voluntarily.

3. Willingness to serve in front line positions.

4. Desire to serve in volunteer units.

5. Studying in an officers' course.

6. Desire to serve as a career soldier.

Table 42: Comparing Averages and T Values for Druze Students' Perceptions (Druze School, Mixed School) Regarding Motivation for IDF

	Type of School			
Motivation to Serve in IDF	Druze	Mixed	T val.	Scale
Desire to be recruited	3.11	2.70	2.00*	4
Willingness to serve in IDF	3.10	2.78	1.98*	4
Desire to be front line	3.59	3.09	1.85*	5
Desire to be in volunteer unit	3.01	2.63	1.97*	4
Officers' course	4.20	3.96	1.16NS	5
Desire to be career soldier	3.06	2.76	1.41NS	4

* Significant to at least 0.05

Examination of the Second Hypothesis

This hypothesis was partially proven. The Druze students studying in the Druze school report a higher level of motivation to serve in the IDF than students in the mixed school.

The hypothesis was supported regarding more military issues and not in issues related to social mobility (social status) and job for the future (regular work place).

Values, Identity and Perception of Democracy

This section of the paper will examine the values and personal attitudes of the Druze students. This will be examined from the main viewpoints:

What is important to the Druze students in their lives - personal values.

The students' Druze values and identity.

Attitudes regarding democracy.

Personal Values

1. The students were asked to mark, for 16 subjects, how much each one is important and valuable to them.
2. In addition to examination of the importance of different values, the students were asked regarding their degree of agreement to a statement regarding willingness to contribute in general: "Don't ask what the State can give me, but rather I can give to the State".
3. The following will present the perceived importance of the various values. The values will be presented in descending order of importance (1-16). The questions had four possible categories of response (very important - not important at all), with high numbers expressing more importance.

The data in the following table express the percentage of those who responded that the issue was very important. Rating appears in parenthesis, and was determined based on the average for the item.

Table 43: Personal Values (Percentage of those responding "Very Important")

Value	% Important	Rating
Regular job	88	(1)
Getting a higher education	79	(2)
Academic achievement	76	(3)
Financial progress	65	(4)
Developing and using skills	60	(5)
Respected social standing	55	(6)
Having a family	51	(7)
Working in an interesting profession	47	(8)
Helping others	46	(9)
Enjoying life	43	(10)
Making a lot of money	38	(11)
Succeeding in the IDF	37	(12)
Succeeding with my partner	36	(13)
Contributing to the State	33	(14)
Participating in public activity	26	(15)
Going abroad	24	(16)

Attitudes Towards Democratic Values

This section examined a number of issues asking the students if they should be "increased", "decreased" or "remain the same thing":

a) Censorship of the media.

b) Freedom to criticize the government and its policies.

c) Freedom to strike.

The following table presents the responses of the students to these three questions. For ease of presentation the data were grouped into 3 categories, from the original five. The data are presented in percentages for all respondents:

Table 44: Attitudes in the Field of Democracy (Percentages)

	Limit	Same	Increase
Censorship of media	35%	29%	36%
Freedom to criticize government	38%	28%	34%
Freedom to strike	39%	24%	37%

The table indicates the following findings:

The attitudes of the Druze students towards this sphere express a clear desire for change. The percent of respondents who would like to keep the situation the same in these given areas is low relative to the categories of limiting or increasing.

The Druze students express a clear preference for increasing freedom to criticize the government policy, followed by freedom to strike, in second place, and then censorship of the media, in last place. Furthermore, differences were found between girls and boys. Girls preferred increased censorship more than boys, and freedom to criticize government policy.

We then examine the attitudes in the field of democracy by type of school. The following table presents the students' attitudes regarding democracy. This scale includes five categories, with high numbers expressing more of a desire for an increase in the area.

Censorship of the Media

* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the following issue: Censorship of the media?

1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase; 5. Increase greatly.

Table 45: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by Type of School

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.25	1.23	50	9	20	31	19	21
Mixed	2.81	1.38	50	24	19	25	17	16

$P<0.05$; $t=1.68$

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding censorship of the media.

When connecting the two categories (4,5) of "increase" and "increase greatly", it was found that the students in the Druze school responded more highly to this question (40%) than the students in the mixed school (33%). This difference is statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

Freedom to Criticize the Government and its Policies

* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the following issue: Criticizing the government and its policies?

1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase; 5. Increase greatly.

Table 46: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by Type of School

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.16	1.13	50	6	26	31	22	15
Mixed	2.78	1.33	50	23	20	25	19	13

P<0.05; t=1.94

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding freedom to express criticism on the government and its policies. When connecting the two categories (4,5) of "increase" and "increase greatly", it was found that the students in the mixed school responded more highly (58%) to the question compared to the students in the Druze school (44%). This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05).

Freedom to Strike

* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the following issue: Freedom to strike?

1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase; 5. Increase greatly.

Table 47: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by Type of School

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.31	1.40	50	19	8	22	28	23
Mixed	2.83	1.42	50	27	15	22	21	15

P<0.05; t=1.94

A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding

freedom to strike. When connecting the two categories (4,5) of "increase" and "increase greatly", it was found that the students in the mixed school responded more highly (41%) to the question compared to the students in the Druze school (29%). This difference is statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

Illustration 3: Attitudes of Druze Students Regarding Democratic Values (Percent)



Youths' National Identity and Connection to the Land

Examination of the Third Hypothesis

The theoretical chapter surveyed the principles of Druze belief and values that Druze youths are raised by, such as reincarnation, belief in fate, etc. Belief in these values encourages Druze youth to volunteer and contribute to the State, despite risk to one's life. Therefore the next hypothesis examines if there is a correlation between belief in the Druze faith and

between the factors of motivation, contribution and volunteering, even at risk to life.

This section first examines national identity of Druze youth, the nature of their national identity, and its strength.

The following table presents the average responses to questions concerning "the strength of your feeling as an Israeli", "as a Druze", and "as an Arab". The scale runs from 1 to 7, with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling.

Table 48: National Identity

Strength of Feeling	Boys	Girls
As an Israeli	5.58	5.78
As a Druze	6.19	6.59
As an Arab	3.69	4.09

The table indicates the following findings:

1. The Druze girls express a higher level feeling as Israelis, Druze and Arabs, compared to the Druze boys who report a lower level of feeling.
2. The Druze students express a stronger identity with their own nation relative to their feelings of being Israeli.
3. The Druze student express fewer feelings of being Arab, compared to their feelings as Druze and Israelis.

Illustration 4: National Identity by Gender of Respondent (Percent)



We examined national identity in an additional fashion, and therefore the students were asked if they felt more Israeli, more Druze or more Arab?

The following table presents the data by percentages.

Table 49: National Identity by Gender (Percents)

	Boys	Girls
More Israeli	11	20
The same	17	25
More Druze	72	55

The table indicates the following findings:

The Druze students feel much more like Druze than Israelis. This finding is more obvious among the boys.

We asked the Druze students an additional question: Are they more similar to Israeli Arabs or to Jews? 52% of the students feel that Druze are more similar to Jews.

Another aspect of national identity is related to language of choice. The Druze students were asked if they prefer to speak Hebrew, Arabic or both languages equally. The following table presents the data by percentages:

Table 50: Preferred Language by Gender (Percents)

	Prefer Hebrew	The Same	Prefer Arabic
Boys	48	44	8
Girls	10	62	28

The table indicates that more than half of the Druze students prefer Hebrew and Arabic, but many more boys than girls prefer Hebrew.

We examined the strength of feeling as an Israeli and a Druze by type of school.

The table presents the average responses. The scale ran from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling.

Table 51: Strength of Feeling as an Israeli and Druze, by type of School

	Druze	Mixed
An Israeli	6.11	5.49
A Druze	6.59	6.21

The table indicates the following findings:

In general, the students in the Druze school express a higher feeling of being Israeli, relative to the students in the mixed school.

The students in the Druze school express a higher feeling of being Druze

Compared to students in the mixed school.

This pattern of findings is similar to that found when examining the data regarding the question: "Do you perceive yourself first as Israeli or first

as Druze"? This question also found that Druze students perceive themselves firstly as Druze and then as Israeli.

We examined if there was a difference in the strength of feeling Druze, Israeli and Arab between the two schools. The following is the distribution of the students' responses regarding Druze identity by type of school ("strength of feeling like a Druze"). The scale runs from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling.

Table 52: Strength of Feeling like Druze, by School

Item	Avg.	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Druze	6.59	1.44	50	5	0	1	1	3	4	86
Mixed	6.21	1.62	50	7	0	2	3	4	5	79

P<0.05; t=1.24

When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a difference was found in the strength of feeling Druze between the Druze students in the Druze school (93%) and the mixed school (88%). However, this difference was not statistically significant.

The following is the distribution of the students' responses regarding Israeli identity by type of school ("strength of feeling like an Israeli"). The scale runs from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling.

Table 53: Strength of Feeling like an Israeli, by School

Item	Avg.	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Druze	6.11	1.56	50	5	2	3	3	4	23	61
Mixed	5.49	2.08	50	9	6	5	7	6	13	54

P<0.05; t=1.69

A significant difference was found in the strength of feeling Israeli,

between Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school. When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a difference was found in the strength of feeling Israeli between the Druze students in the Druze school (88%) and the mixed school (73%). This difference was statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

The following is the distribution of the students' responses regarding Arab identity by type of school ("strength of feeling like an Arab"). The scale runs from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling.

Table 54: Strength of Feeling like an Arab, by School

Item	Avg.	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Druze	4.04	2.11	50	20	7	10	20	13	10	19
Mixed	4.46	2.12	50	15	7	7	24	12	7	28

$P<0.05$; $t=1.33$

When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a difference was found in the strength of feeling Arab between the Druze students in the Druze school (42%) and the mixed school (47%). However, this difference was not statistically significant.

We now move on to examine the connection that the youths feel to the land of Israel. The participants in the research were asked directly: "Are you sure you will remain in Israel, i.e., not move permanently to another country?"

The following table presents the average responses by gender (on a five category scale, with higher numbers expressing more confidence regarding remaining in Israel).

Table 55: Connection to Land by Gender of Respondent

Gender	Average
Boys	4.03
Girls	4.25

The table indicates the following findings:

Most of the respondents report great confidence that they will remain in Israel (over 70% answered in the two highest categories).

The girls express a bit more confidence in staying in Israel, compared to the boys.

We examined the responses by type of school also. The following table presents the data:

Table 56: Connection to Land by Type of School

School	Average
Druze	4.30
Mixed	3.99

The table indicates the following findings:

A relatively high number of Druze students will consider moving to a Druze country if it is created. The differences between boys and girls is not large.

We examined how satisfied the students were with their Druze Heritage studies at both the Druze and the mixed schools.

* How satisfied are you with your Druze Heritage studies at school?

1. Very little; 2. Little; 3. Medium. 4. Satisfied; 5. Very satisfied.

Table 57: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Druze Heritage

Item	Average	S.D.	N	1	2	3	4	5
Druze	3.75	1.21	50	8	5	28	25	35
Mixed	3.50	1.32	50	11	10	29	19	31

$P<0.05$; $t=0.99$

When combining the two categories (4,5), satisfied and very satisfied, a difference was found between the students in the Druze school (60%) and the students in the mixed school (50%).

Summary of Values, Identity and Perception of Democracy

The Druze students emphasize academic achievements, higher education and respected social status (progress and mobility).

Contribution to the State and taking part in public activity are rated lower.

The Druze students express a high level of feeling Israeli. They express a strong identification to their nation (as Druze), relative to their feelings as Israelis.

The Druze student express a relatively weak feeling as Arabs.

Most of the Druze students express confidence that they will remain in Israel.

The Druze students in the Druze school express a higher level of national identity and a stronger connection to Israel relative to the students in the mixed school.

Limiting or expanding freedom for criticizing the government, censorship and freedom to strike are related not only to attitudes and values in the field of democracy. We also see that political and religious attitudes affect the attitudes of students in these areas.

In order to examine our third hypotheses, is there a correlation between Druze beliefs and between motivational factors and volunteering for the State, we first examined if there was a correlation between the research indices in the field of Druze identity, beliefs and values.

We then examined if there was a correlation between the research indices in the field of factors behind motivation and volunteering for the State.

The following are the inter-correlation calculation results between various attitude items regarding Druze identity, beliefs and tradition.

Table 58: Inter-Correlations between Attitude Items Regarding Druze Identity and Values

	Druze Identity	Israeli Identity	Arab Identity	Reincarnation	Fate	Traditional lifestyle	Academic Ed. For Girls
Druze Identity	1.00						
Israeli Identity	**0.37	1.00					
Arab Identity	-0.09	*0.13	1.00				
Reincar-nation	**0.22	0.09	-0.06	1.00			
Fate	0.09	0.07	*-0.11	**0.46	1.00		
Traditional Lifestyle	0.08	0.06	-0.05	**0.28	**0.22	1.00	
Academic Ed. For Girls	-0.05	0.05	0.04	**0.21	*0.12	*-0.14	1.00

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

The table presents the correlations between items of Druze identity and values. We see that Druze identity is correlated positively and significantly with Israeli identity and belief in reincarnation.

Furthermore, belief in fate, reincarnation and agreement with a traditional lifestyle are positively correlated with one another.

The following are the inter-correlational calculation results between various attitude items regarding recruitment and motivation.

Table 59: Inter-Correlations Between Attitude Items Regarding Recruitment and Motivation

	Service length	Recruit to IDF	Front line position	Volunteer Unit	Career service
Service Length	1.00				
Recruit to IDF	**-0.35	1.00			
Front line position	**-0.31	**0.49	1.00		
Volunteer Unit	**-0.29	**0.27	**0.58	1.00	
Career Service	**-0.28	*0.14	**0.25	*0.18	1.00

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

The table presents the correlations between attitude items regarding recruitment and motivation. We see that the attitude items which express a positive attitude towards service and motivation were positively correlated with one another.

The following is a table of correlations between various attitude items regarding factors behind motivation to serve and Druze identity and beliefs.

Table 60: Inter-Correlations Between Attitude Items Regarding Motivation to Serve and Druze Identity and Beliefs

	Druze identity	Israeli identity	Arab identity	Reincarnation	Belief in fate
Service Length	-0.09	-0.12	*0.14	0.08	0.05
Recruit to IDF	*0.14	*0.18	*-0.13	-0.04	0.07
Front line position	*0.13	0.08	*-0.19	0.08	0.06
Volunteer Unit	0.09	0.17	*-0.14	0.09	0.08
Career Service	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.03	-0.01

*$p<0.05$

Basically, the system of correlations indicates positive or negative correlations as expected. The attitude items expressing a positive attitude towards Druze identity and Druze values were found to be positively correlated with one another, and negatively correlated with Arab identity.

The attitude items expressing a positive attitude towards military service and motivation to serve were, in general, positively correlated with Israeli and Druze identity and negatively correlated with Arab identity. However, the motivation variables were not significantly correlated with the variables of Druze belief.

A number of correlations are worthy of mention:

- A high correlation was found between the strength of feeling like a Druze and the strength of feeling Israeli (0.37). No correlations were found between feeling like an Arab and feeling like a Druze.

- Druze identity was positively and significantly correlated with recruitment to the IDF and holding a front line position, and positively but not significantly correlated with volunteering to volunteer units and a desire to become a career soldier.
- Belief in reincarnation was almost significantly positively correlated with volunteering to a volunteer unit and holding a front line position.

In summary of the third hypothesis, as we can see from the correlation tables:

1. Druze identity is positively and significantly correlated with Israeli identity.
2. Druze identity is significantly correlated with Druze beliefs (reincarnation) and not significantly correlated with belief in fate.
3. Druze identity is positively and significantly correlated with some motivational factors (recruitment to IDF, volunteering for a front line position), and not significantly with some of the motivational factors (volunteering, career soldier).

These findings partially support the third research hypothesis that students with a strong Druze identity will volunteer for a front line position. Furthermore, we found partial support for the common opinion among the Druze that there is a correlation between keeping principles of Druze belief and between volunteering at risk to life.

Discussion and Conclusions

This dissertation addresses the attitudes of Druze youth regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, national identity and security. Its aim is to examine the attitudes of twelfth grade students regarding issues of security, democratic values, and Druze identity and values.

The present research examines a number of hypotheses regarding similarities and areas of difference between two types of schools, a Druze school and a mixed school, regarding a number of issues.

The issues that we chose to examine are issues that are part of the public agenda in Israeli society, as the crisis in Israeli democracy and the criticism unleashed at the government and its head, after the Second Lebanon War; the continuing decades' old conflict with the Palestinians, and the question of draft evasion and the decline in the level of motivation to serve, have been critical questions which the educational system of Israeli deals with daily.

The First Research Hypothesis

This hypothesis examines if there is a difference in perceptions of Druze students learning in a Druze school and Druze students learning in a mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.

This hypothesis was partially supported from a statistical standpoint. It was proven for most of the items related to the students' perceptions regarding the desires of Israelis and Palestinians for peace. However, apparently, regarding the results of the peace process, the students are carefully optimistic, and there is no significant difference between students in the two schools.

The peace process with the Palestinians has been going on for a long time, and each side is convinced that it is doing its best to bring the process to final resolution of the conflict, expressed in a final agreement, and that the other side is the one putting up barriers to the process. Each side, both Jews and Palestinians, is trying to broadcast that it is more interested in peace.

Gating (1985) addresses two components of the concept of peace, attitude towards it and willingness to concede for it. Attitude towards peace can be more or less positive, optimistic or pessimistic, and so can be one's degree of willingness to concede and compromise. The perceptions of the Druze students that Israeli Jews show a more positive attitude towards peace than the Arabs, is reinforced in the findings of the study by Ichilov and Massaway (1994).

A finding that stands out, is that in most items of the research, the Druze students' responses were focused on high or low categories of response, which signifies an extreme position. An explanation for this may be found in Olivia's (1972) division of the Druze in Israel. He divided them into three groups, two groups which are the majority and are interested in identifying as Israelis, and one third group, the minority, which totally identifies with the Arab nation. This attribute of having an extreme attitude among Druze youth can be explained as a behavioral pattern, a rebellion and a response to the atmosphere that exists in Druze towns after the Second Lebanon War, and direct hits to the population, particularly in Majar, which was badly damaged, and fell victim to the war.

The factors which affect perception of the concept of peace, in recent years, have begin to focus on cultural and situational influences over

perception of peace, and this is also true regarding the concept of war and conflict (Raviv et al., 1998). According to Raviv et al., three factors affecting the perception of peace in the individual may be discerned:

1. Historical narrative and social beliefs created as a consequence.
2. The unique situation in which the individual lives.
3. Educational experiences of the individual within society.

These factors affect the creation of social knowledge in every society, including events specific to each society, such as war. Conflicts are strong central experiences which have a decisive impact over society. However, every society represents these concepts differently, based on their own experiences and specific conditions. Social beliefs in societies in states of conflict develop social beliefs in order to create psychological conditions vital for coping better with the conflict (Bar-Tal, 1999). These psychological conditions include dedication to society and the land, high motivation to contribute, coping with physical and psychological stress, willingness for personal dedication, unity, solidarity, maintaining society's aims, perseverance, courage and the ability to suffer. Social behaviors that are acquired and social institutions (educational systems) transmit these to members of society, and maintain them. One of the ways schools do this is by formal education: curricula and textbooks. When reality changes or it is necessary to prepare for a new reality, there is always a need to change curricula and study materials (Firer and Eduoan, 1997).

Regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict and the peace process currently occurring, the Israeli educational system and that of the Palestinian

Authority are reorganizing both regarding values and beliefs that have been taught to date, and regarding study materials.

Until recently, education in Israel presented different values as spiritual guidelines of Israeli society, such as values related to physical strength, power, military supremacy, commitment of the individual to the State, etc. Furthermore, the belief that "it is good to die for our country", was emphasized (Dagan, 1994). Slowly, over the years, a number of these values have been undermined as a result of a changing reality, the Intifada and the Second Lebanon war. Now there is a perceptual change occurring. For example, the existence of the State is possible not only through force but also through peaceful methods, accompanied by educational experiences which should affect perceptions regarding the concept of peace, such as educational curricula regarding peace, workshops, meetings between groups in conflicts, activities within the schools, and coordination of curricula in Civics and the peace process, which is taking place between Israel and the Palestinians.

The differences between Druse students studying in the Druze school and those of students in the mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process is explained by their different specific situations related to situational factors which have affected their concept of peace in different ways. These explanations are supported by the studies of Hakvoort et al., (1998) which found that perception of the concept of peace develops within a social and historical context.

The Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis discusses the impact of place (the village) over the attitudes of students. This hypothesis was supported.

This hypothesis is based on the social contact theory, positing that exposure of Druze students in a mixed school to an Arab population (which does not serve in the army) will affect motivation and willingness to volunteer and contribute to the State. Students in mixed villages come into social and personal contact with Arabs, maintain communication with them, and feel neighborly, socially and culturally. Apparently the sense of discrimination and inequality and exposure to the nationalist Arab propaganda by Arab political parties, affects their willingness to contribute and volunteer to the State.

We found differences between the attitudes of Druze students in the Druze school and those of Druze students in mixed schools, in all areas related to security and military service. These differences were significant regarding their desire to be recruited and to serve in front line positions and their desire to volunteer to volunteer units. We found a non-significant difference regarding the desire to become an officer and to become a career soldier. These findings can be explained by the degree of closeness and exposure of these students, learning in a mixed school, to Arabs who do not serve in the army. Peres (1976) showed that most Arab students in Israel do not identify with the State.

These differences between attitudes of Druze students in the Druze school and in the mixed school, are a result of different outlooks among the students themselves. The students in the Druze school express more positive attitudes towards service than students in the mixed school. If we compare this with the studies of Jack (1975), Hoffman (1972) and Smooha (1976), they found that among Arabs, Arab identity is in first place. In the present study, among the Druze students, it was in third

place, ranked very much lower than Druze and Israeli identity. We found that about 73% of the students in the Druze school express a desire to be drafted into the army, versus 53% in the mixed school. About 65% of the students in the Druze school are highly motivated to serve in front line positions, versus 51% of the students in the mixed school.

Amir (1968) found that inter-ethnic contact will lead to solidarity and understanding between ethnic groups. The students in the mixed school are in daily contact with the Arab public, and have good relations between members of their town, going to common events, celebrations, funerals, etc., developing solidarity and understanding.

One of the research questions at the foundation of this study, which is very important to Druze leadership in Israel is: How do Druze students define the components of their identity and is there a difference between the identity of Druze students in a Druze school and that of students in a mixed school? The research data indicated the existence of three clear components involved in perception of Druze identity.

1. The religious ethnic component.

2. The Israeli citizenship component.

3. The Arab cultural component.

The students were asked to rate their identity on a seven point scale, and the first definition that they provided for their identity was the religious ethnic component, which stood out in first place. The civil Israeli component stood out in second place. The third, Arab cultural component was not strongly emphasized by most of the students, and generally received a low rating.

The clearness of these three components of identity among the students testifies to the fact that the students maintain multiple identities. The professional literature addresses the connection between maintaining multiple cultural identities and between quality of life, indicating that understanding the situation of an individual coping with multiple cultural identities can lead to two possible predictions (Ben Shalom and Hornchik, 2000): On one hand, it may be hypothesized that maintaining one identity at the expense of the others, prevents conflict and therefore contributes to the individual's sense of well-being. On the other hand, maintaining a number of group identities, which the individual sees positively, may be a source for social, cultural and material resources. Additional studies have indicated that a consolidated cultural identity is important in order for minorities to adapt (Phinney, 1995), unlike others who have seen the connection between a certain cultural identity and between adaptation (Epstein & Levin, 1996).

The research data testify that the frequency of the religious ethnic component was the most dominant, strong and obvious among most of the students in both schools, among all three identity components. This component of Druze identity was not found to be different among the Druze students in the Druze school and the mixed school. On the other hand, in the civilian Israeli component part of the Druze students' identity definition, there was a significant difference between the Druze students in the Druze school and the mixed school. The students in the Druze school identified more with the State, and felt the State was a homeland and nation. Druze heritage also reinforces this perception regarding the State by indicating a number of countries which can be considered a homeland, one of which is Israel, compared to the Druze students in the

mixed school, who are under the impact of Arab students, most of whom do not consider Israel as their State and are discriminated against in development of common tows for Arabs and Druze.

In the cultural-Arabic component as a component, this is not consolidated among the Druze students, and their treatment of it is mainly cognitive. Belonging to Arab culture stems from the language that they speak, which is considered their mother tongue, and the fact that their written religious works are in Arabic. Druze heritage is also learned in that language. There is no nationalistic component to this element (Hutnik, 1991).

The Arabic cultural component in Druze identity is considered to be a problematic component by the Druze students, because there is a certain difficulty among the students regarding defining their Arab cultural identity. This difficulty stems from the need to include social personality and cultural aspects in one concept, whereas these aspects are often not in keeping with one another. Many students do not feel any Arabic cultural connection in their identity. What is important among these students is the religious component, which explains the lack of feeling belonging to the Arab culture in their identity, as this component is perceived as a problem. Arabic as a language is not enough to make them feel cultural belonging, because the Druze religion is different than other Arab religions and the Arabic concept is perceived in terms of Palestinians, Moslems and Christians.

Alhaj (1997) addressed this problem in defining identity among the Druze. He posits that the source of this problem involves the fact that the Druze sect in Israel has chosen ethnic particularism, cultivating and encouraging government in this way (Oppenheimer, 1978).

The Third Hypothesis

This hypothesis examined the correlation between maintaining the principles of Druze belief and between contribution and volunteering at risk of life. When examining this hypothesis, we compared between identity items and Druze values, and between motivational factors to serve. Our hypothesis was that the stronger one's Druze beliefs, the higher motivation will be to serve in the IDF. This hypothesis was partially proven only. We found that there is a positive correlation between Druze identity and between Druze beliefs (reincarnation, fate), and between Druze identity and motivational factors (front line positions, volunteering in volunteer units).

However, we did not find any direct correlation between Druze beliefs and motivational factors. We expected that in light of the common belief within the Druze community - belief in fate and reincarnation, this would encourage Druze youths to volunteer for dangerous life threatening tasks, and that a correlation would be found between components of Druze belief and motivational factors. The principles of Druze belief direct Druze youths toward accepting the will of God. According to this principle the Druze trust the supreme power and accept their fate out of a belief that it has been preordained from birth. As a result of their belief in reincarnation, and the soul moving from one body to another without dying, the Druze youth is not afraid of risking his life, and thus serving in front line units is typical.

The explanation for the fact that our hypothesis was not fully supported: A correlation was found between Druze beliefs and motivation to volunteer in volunteer units. Motivation to serve in a front line unit

creates social status, because in Israel and in the Druze sect, a military career is a high status symbol, paving the way to receiving an important role in the county and high respected social standing in the community.

We find that 92% of the respondents in this study noted that they believe in the principles of Druze faith. This fact does not allow distribution over this variable, and therefore there is no correlation with the motivational variable.

We see that the present research and its findings are important, and recommends further research in the field in order to learn about the perceptions of Druze students regarding military service, the identity component and Druze values.

1. Examining the process of identity development of the Druze student in Israel, and the impact of the components of identity over his future behavior.
2. Reexamination of the contents of the Druze Heritage curriculum and teaching Druze values to students.
3. Changing government policies and using a policy of "remedial discrimination" towards the Druze in Israel in order to achieve full equality.
4. A long term study to examine if a change occurs in Druze youths' opinions towards the IDF and state security before and after military service.
5. Examination of the role of the Druze school in teaching democratic and Druze values to its students.

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Appendix